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No “Market” for Truth: The Weaknesses of 
Free Speech-Based Defenses to Credit Rating 
Industry Liability 
by ANDY CARR*
Introduction 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are essential components of the global 
financial systems.  The major CRAs—Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & 
Poor’s—primarily serve the financial systems in two key ways.  CRAs first 
serve as “gatekeepers,” inasmuch as their ratings determine whether a 
finacial instrument is “investment grade” under federal and state laws.  
Second, CRAs act as information-facilitators for the complicated 
instruments being bought and sold within the system.  In part because of their 
systemic significance, CRAs faced especially harsh scrutiny in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis and Great Recession, accused not only of lavishing 
inflated ratings on the riskiest assets, but also recklessly promoting the 
securitization of increasingly complex, nearly impenetrable financial 
instruments.  Initial public scrutiny was followed by waves of litigation 
which resurfaced long-dormant questions about the CRAs’ exposure to 
liability and decades-old defenses of their rating “opinions.”  Accordingly, 
this Note reexamines the nexus between the CRAs’ profound importance as 
financial institutions and their defenses against claims for liability in fueling 
the last recession, focusing especially on their decades-old claims of First 
Amendment protections–a resurgent issue in recent litigation. 
This Note synthesizes a review of both recent trends in federal case law 
involving CRA defendants as well as the secondary literature in the years 
following the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.  The primary contributions are twofold.  First, the updated overview of 
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sincerest thanks to Philip He, Lucy Rose Taylor, John Deagon, and Brittany Scott, along with the 
rest of the editorial staff at Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, for their thoughtful comments, 
suggestions, and overall guidance throughout the preparation of this Note.  Additional thanks are 
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CRAs’ successes and failures in state and federal courts suggests that, while 
the CRAs successfully defended many suits in recent years, the financial cri-
sis and legislative responses thereto have built extensive records of the 
CRAs’ key roles in exacerbating systemic risks and their acknowledgment 
of falsity of their peak-bubble ratings.  As case records and the developing 
research literature suggest, the terrain has shifted toward less-CRA-favorable 
judicial approaches and standards of review.  Second, recent legislative de-
velopments (e.g., Dodd-Frank’s section 933) and a series of federal court 
cases (especially Abu Dhabi v. Morgan Stanley and Genesee County v. 
Thornburg) highlight the weaknesses of CRA’s defenses––and especially 
their maximalist claims for First Amendment-grounded protection of their 
ratings.
While litigation challenging the CRAs has garnered increasing promi-
nence in recent years, various other legal challenges to financial sector actors 
since the Great Recession have heightened pressure on these institutions.  
Among others, novel theories of financial sector actor liability helped win 
notable victories against investment banks in their transaction financing or 
deal-advising capacities, as well as related rulings against private equity 
firms, e.g., aiding and abetting liability for fraudulent actions knowingly 
committed by and in concert with investment banks in mergers and acquisi-
tions.  Remarkably, many of these cases have come from Delaware, both 
from the Chancery Court and from the state’s Supreme Court, suggesting 
Delaware’s “race to the bottom” corporate regulatory approaches and histor-
ically manager-friendly dispositions are less-certain now than in the recent 
past.
As key state and federal courts have scrutinized financial sector actors 
more closely, with diverging case outcomes set to establish or sharpen an 
emerging circuit split, the legislative branch has begun moving in the oppo-
site direction.  A White House-backed deregulatory bill, for example, passed 
a threshold vote to enter Senate debate in early March 2018.  If passed in its 
current form, the bill would roll back regulatory requirements, including the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s stress-testing requirements for large lending institutions, 
with the defendants from the aforementioned cases prominently among 
them.  The rejection of Dodd-Frank’s “too big to fail” provisions may 
heighten the likelihood of myriad legal challenges facing plaintiffs in similar 
cases.  This uncertain regulatory environment comes amid recently renewed 
media attention upon the latest financial sector misconduct controversies, 
emerging in the wake of the 1MDB corruption scandals in Malaysia, where 
Goldman Sachs’s role has come under Singaporean investigators’ scrutiny, 
and following the latest stress-test failure of German banking giant Deutsche 
Bank.  Nevertheless, the CRAs have fended off most legal challenges, even 
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in the aftermath of the financial crisis and under Dodd-Frank––for the mo-
ment.
The increased doctrinal uncertainty puts CRA regulations–and their 
speech––in prime position for reconsideration by the United States Supreme 
Court in coming years.  Should one or more appeals from lower court cases 
concerning CRA liability reach the United States Supreme Court, it would 
be the first time since the 1980s and would invite reconsideration of 
unresolved free speech issues from Greenmoss Builders and Lowe.
Considering the highly inconsistent state and federal case law over the last 
decade, the CRAs should view those earlier Supreme Court cases not as 
protective guardrails for their own benefit, but rather as relics, unlikely to 
provide significant utility or security in the modern financial regulatory 
milieu.
The subsequent sections of this Note explicate signal recent cases and 
current doctrinal uncertainties, while considering both foundational free 
speech doctrines and the systemic shockwaves of the financial crisis and 
Great Recession.  Both subjects are vital context for post-recession cases, 
necessary to distinguish the scope of concerns from the earlier landmark 
cases of the 1980s.  Part II reviews theoretical foundations for key free 
speech doctrines more broadly, with particular emphasis on the roles of 
speech in self-governance and the “search for truth,” and an overview of 
commercial speech principles.  It concludes by situating the present analysis 
within the larger First Amendment research literature, explaining the 
narrow—but substantively impactful—contribution to broader theoretical 
debates.  Part III turns to the financial services sector, the events leading up 
to the financial crisis, and the crucial roles played by the CRAs in domestic 
and global finance over time.  Part IV explores the recent case law on 
financial actor liability broadly, including three key cases involving CRA 
defendants, these cases’ outcomes, and their assessments of speech claims, 
where applicable.  Part V summarizes recent proposed legislative and 
administrative changes to the post-recession regulatory scheme, with 
comparisons to alternative approaches globally, along with a discussion of 
the likely effects of recent membership changes on the Supreme Court on 
CRA regulation and First Amendment jurisprudence.  Finally, Part VI 
concludes with a brief synthesis of the historical and up-to-date case law 
developments, discussing implications for CRAs’ historical free speech 
claims, with suggestions for further research in these areas. 
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I.  Theoretical Foundations of Free Speech: Imperatives for 
Protecting Expression 
A.  Self-Governance and Finding Truth 
The theoretical justifications for vigorously protecting freedom of 
speech are manifold, yet have remained remarkably consistent throughout 
constitutional history.  Among others, three notions have proven especially 
consistently influential: the importance of open and free expression for 
democratic self-governance; the value of the “marketplace of ideas” in 
allowing a search for truth; and free speech’s importance in protecting 
individual autonomy, i.e., the individual’s intrinsic right to find their own 
truth and values unencumbered by the state’s actions.1  Taken together, these 
rationales underlie a range of views regarding constitutional interpretations, 
from the bench and from academia, as well as in society at large.  As ordering 
principles, each theoretical view finds currency across the spectrum of First 
Amendment protections; they encompass both Justice Hugo Black’s 
“maximalist” First Amendment approach2 and the views of commentators 
pushing for greater openness to government regulation of certain forms of 
expression.3
 1.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 
(1982) (referring more broadly to speech protections for “individual self-fulfillment” or “individual 
self-realization”).
 2.  Justice Hugo Black’s “absolute” regard for the First Amendment rarely garnered a 
majority on the United States Supreme Court, but nonetheless has become a universal touchstone 
for free speech scholars and activists, see generally R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1977) (discussing Justice Black’s concurrence in New York Times v. Sullivan,
including his statement that the “unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs 
is . . . the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment”); Anthony Lewis, Justice Black and the 
First Amendment, 38 ALA. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (1987) (discussing, inter alia, Justice Black’s lead 
opinion from Bridges v. California, where Black’s majority reversed the convictions of the Los 
Angeles Times and Teamsters Union leader Harry Bridges for contempt of court after making public 
statements which might prejudice an ongoing court case involving the Union); accord Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297, 299 (1964) 
(Black & Goldberg, JJ. concurring).   
 3.  See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (arguing that commercial speech should not be protected by the First 
Amendment at all, “a complete denial” being “consistent with” and “required by” free speech 
doctrines as it fails to further the interests and purposes of the underlying protections); Robert C. 
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and 
Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170 (1996) (arguing—in the context of regulating 
public conduct of urban panhandlers and “chronic” homelessness in public spaces—that First 
Amendment scholars “self-consciously gives priority to the communicative aspects of street 
behavior” as grounds for heightened protections, while “other features, including . . . effects on the 
liberties of other street users” go ignored); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content 
Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (1994) 
(arguing that U.S. Supreme Court opinions impliedly—and properly—distinguish types of speech 
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As in the far-ranging academic debates, state and federal courts’ 
approaches to First Amendment jurisprudence and the various doctrines 
established in published opinions long have proven less coherent than 
theories might suggest.4  Nonetheless, some highly generalized consensus 
suggests that, up to the farthest edges of conventional notions of protected 
speech and only in narrow circumstances may the government regulate 
speech without “abridging” it in contravention of the First Amendment, 
despite somewhat imprecise conceptual bounds.  While writing on one 
categorical, if doctrinally abandoned exception, the “fighting words” 
doctrine, Justice Frank Murphy articulated a broader understanding of the 
outer bounds of free speech in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.  In Justice 
Murphy’s broad reading of First Amendment protections, to which the 
Supreme Court unanimously acceded, only in “certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech [which] are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and [which] are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.”5  Among the typologies of free 
speech forms, very few have been characterized as having “no essential part” 
of these critical democratic functions––e.g., knowing lies or statements 
which endanger listeners, legitimate incitements of violence, and so on.6
content depending on context, distinguishing publicly acrimonious speech from, inter alia, sexually 
harassing speech arising in work environments); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2007) (discussing the elastic nature of “strict scrutiny” review as 
applied to midcentury United States Supreme Court cases); Daniel Halberstern, Commercial
Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 771, 773 (1999) (noting the unclear juxtaposition of professional service providers, e.g., 
physicians or attorneys, possessing First Amendment rights under law against the permitted 
instances of licensure and other regulatory requirements on those professions, as in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey–upholding a state law requirement that doctors provide information to women 
seeking abortions, including alternatives); Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy and the 
First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15 (1967) (reviewing less-protected commercial speech, 
especially in broadcast radio and television media, drawn from myriad, political-ideologically 
diverse critiques); accord Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).  
 4.  See Redish, supra note 1, at 591.  
 5.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); see generally Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 192–93 (1983).   
 6.  Anthea J. Jeffery, Free Speech and Press: An Absolute Right, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 197, 201 
(1986) (noting a range of exceptions to free speech protections, including speech which incites 
violence, undermines national security interests, violates the privacy interests of other individuals, 
or results in prejudices impugning free trials, among others); accord Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919) (including Justice Holmes’ exception for panic-inducing speech, such as 
erroneously shouting “fire” in a theater); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that 
speech which incites “imminent lawless violence” is not protected if the speech aims to incite and 
is likely to produce it); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding there is no protection for 
“true threats,” distinguishing between a protected KKK rally burning a cross and the unprotected 
burning of a cross on a private individual’s yard to intimidate them); Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
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Free speech typologies further subdivide expression depending on its 
content, where content-neutral and noninvasive regulations generally are 
permitted.  Such “core” or “political speech” has been called “the central 
meaning of the First Amendment,”7 and thus afforded the most expansive 
protections from government interference.  Protecting political expression is 
essential to a democratic system of governance, necessitating protections 
from within the mainstream ideologies of American politics to the furthest 
reaches of its fringes.8  Traditionally, then, speech directed to self-
governance—to a citizen “[having] the information and ideas necessary for 
[democratic] decisionmaking”—has been argued to be deserving of absolute 
protection9, or at least given expansive room to allow “more speech” to cure 
free expression’s consequences.10
Another related justification for vibrant First Amendment protections 
concerns Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous “marketplace of ideas” 
metaphor, which contends that “the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”11  Although 
this second theoretical basis has generated extraordinary controversy and 
criticism,12 Justice Holmes’s metaphor remains a common touchstone for 
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding, as applied to the plaintiffs, that their “support” and “training,” 
or other forms of “assistance” to State Department-designated terrorist organizations, was not 
protected speech, and that provisions of a federal statute prohibiting such assistance were not
unconstitutionally vague). 
 7.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273. 
 8.  See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 367 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute 
banning all cross burnings, including protected ideology-driven burnings by the KKK, thus risking 
government suppression of unpopular ideas); accord Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
(holding protests of a military service member’s funeral on public land is protected by the First 
Amendment’s bar on content and viewpoint-based restrictions of messages); cf. Redish, supra note 
1, at 596 (critiquing “democratic process” arguments as fundamentally limited, since this function 
of free speech does not empirically result in “[facilitation of] the political process” or “foster [only 
the values associated with expressive] conduct of the political process”).  
 9.  Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 447 (1983).  
 10.  See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (noting 
the limitations of the “more-speech” approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as both 
“clearly inaccurate,” given numerous topical exceptions to free speech, and “question-begging”); 
cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“When Congress finds that a problem exists, 
we must give that finding due deference . . . remedies [for improper political campaign conduct] 
enacted by law, however, must comply with the First Amendment; and it is our law and our tradition 
that more speech, not less, is the governing rule”).  
 11.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 12.  See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.
J. 1 (landmark article challenging the veracity of the underlying “marketplace” reasoning, 
especially its reliance upon a rationality assumption and its susceptibility to entrenching extant 
power structures, rather than fostering debate); Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The 
Marketplace of Ideas as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 383 (2014) (challenging the metaphor 
on grounds that the “free market” assumptions underlying it are not only faulty, but diametrically 
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free speech advocates of all political stripes––and tracks well with the 
Supreme Court’s abovementioned rulings over the nearly 100 years since 
Abrams.
B.  Commercial Speech Offers Informational Value 
While less robustly protected than “core” speech, the comparatively 
lower-value commercial speech has been protected from state intrusions as 
well.  The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech in myriad ways: 
as speech which “propose[s] a commercial transaction,”13 speech which 
“disseminat[es] information as to who is producing and selling what product, 
for what reason, and at what price,”14 or communication which is “related 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”15  In Central
Hudson, the Supreme Court provided a seminal justification for ensuring 
protections of commercial speech: 
Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of 
the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal 
interest in the fullest possible dissemination of informationFalse 
Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version 
of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some 
accurate information is better than no information at all.16
Since Central Hudson, restrictions on commercial speech have been 
subjected to careful evaluation.  Whereas false or “misleading” advertising 
and other forms of commercial speech “related to unlawful activity” may be 
banned altogether17, “the government’s power is more circumscribed” vis-à-
vis restrictions upon all other modes of commercial speech.18  Otherwise, 
regulations of commercial speech generally “must assert a substantial 
interest” and “the [chosen] regulatory technique must be in proportion to that 
opposed to economic reality–that markets notably are especially bad at discerning “truth”); Bill 
Shaw, Corporate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 7 J. CORP. L. 265 (1981–82) (arguing that 
the extension of free speech protections to corporations in the political arena is anathema to 
“marketplace” justifications); Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: 
Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181 (2007).   
 13.  Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).  
 14.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976).
 15.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980).
 16.  Id. at 561–62.  
 17.  Id. at 563–64.  
 18.  Id. at 564.  
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interest,” that is, “designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal” through the 
least invasive means practicable.19
Commercial speech protections—however broad—are not boundless.  
The Court has refused to dissolve the boundary separating commercial 
expression from “core” expression, even where advertising “links a product 
to a current public debate,” no matter how salient the controversy in 
question.20  In fine, commercial speech regulations are defined by a certain 
tension: any such regulations still must be circumscribed carefully, yet they 
generally receive less-searching, less-assertive analysis by reviewing courts 
when challenged. 
C.  Conceptual Problems with Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The foregoing context helps frame the issues in the subsequent sections, 
but the key issues herein must be distinguished from other, larger debates in 
First Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship.  The general outlines of 
commercial speech doctrine have faced sharp criticism from various 
scholars, particularly works focusing on the intersections of “free speech and 
economic power.”21  While these critiques variously provided theoretical and 
empirical arguments that, as in the marketplaces of the modern economy, the 
conflation of money and speech in the “marketplace of ideas” provides a 
double meaning to the common maxim “money talks”––in both types of 
“marketplaces,” money “talks” and money amplifies the voices of some over 
others correspondingly.22
First Amendment scholar Martin Redish provides a concise, 
overarching series of refutations of the foregoing criticisms, but sharpens his 
focus in commercial speech contexts in calling out others’ “considerations 
of normative political ideology”––meaning, per Redish, many criticisms of 
money-as-speech and of commercial speech protections generally are 
partisan-ideological by nature, often from the political left, “contravene[ing] 
the principle of ‘epistemological humility’ on questions of normative 
value.”23  His central, relevant thesis––that “restricting the use of money in 
the expressive marketplace silences” and that “no basis in free speech theory 
exists to justify the disparate treatment of corporate or commercial speech 
 19.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.  
 20.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 
U.S. at 563, n. 5).  
 21.  See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE 
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2001), for an overview of these criticisms and a forceful argument 
rejecting them on various constitutional and democratic theory based grounds.  
 22.  Id. at 1–3.  
 23.  Id. at 3. 
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on the basis of its profit motive”24––may provide a reasonable justification 
for minimal commercial speech regulation as the presumption under the First 
Amendment, but it is immaterial to the present analysis.  In the context of 
U.S. credit rating agencies, as discussed in the following section, the 
“product” is the “speech”––i.e., the ratings and other assessments by the 
agencies, in the issuer-pays model, are both the “products” (what securities 
issuers are paying the agencies for) and the “speech” for which the agencies 
claim First Amendment protections when challenged in litigation.  Thus, the 
present focus concerns a much narrower––and much less theoretically 
consonant––debate than the ones highlighted by Redish and others, although 
it is a debate with profound, real-world economic and financial consequences 
of grave concern. 
D.  Speech Claims and the CRAs Muddle Ratings’ “Opinions” 
Under the First Amendment 
While the foregoing definitions and analytical frameworks for 
considering commercial speech are workable (if not fully clear), the Supreme 
Court has injected significant doctrinal ambiguity in one notable industry: 
credit rating agencies.  Given the systemic importance of the credit rating 
agencies (CRAs), this is a curiously unique carve-out from the traditionally 
comprehensive approaches toward First Amendment jurisprudence worth 
exploring in detail.  Generally, the CRAs are private firms which issue 
assessments (credit ratings) for a vast range of institutions, financial 
instruments, and corporations, including complex analyses of those entities’ 
underlying creditworthiness as a whole.25  The largest American CRAs––
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch––control 91% of the securities 
ratings market in the country26 and play a vital role in the modern global 
financial system.27  Although exact alphanumeric ratings differ slightly 
across all three firms, a “AAA” rating uniformly ranks highest, meaning the 
rated entity or financial instrument is both “investment grade” and perceived 
to be a low-risk investment; ratings at or below “BBB,” however, are 
 24.  REDISH, supra note 21.   
 25.  In the CRA context, “creditworthiness” evaluations consider the referent entity’s “ability 
to repay obligations or its likelihood of not defaulting” on repayments.  See Nasdaq, Credit Rating
(2011), www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/c/credit-rating.   
 26.  Dori K. Bailey, The New York Times and Credit Rating Agencies: Indistinguishable 
Under First Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 DENV. U. L. REV. 275, 335 (2016).  
 27.  John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The 
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM.
B.L. REV. 109 (2009).   
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considered below- or non-investment grade,28 while “C” or “D” ratings 
(“speculative grade” investments) “either signal a higher level of credit risk 
or that a default has already occurred.”29
Facially, ratings issued by CRAs appear akin to well-settled objects of 
commercial speech regulation.30  Following two formative cases in 1985—
Lowe31 and Greenmoss Builders32—the Court accordingly appeared to 
endorse the credit ratings/advertising comparison.  Whether the Court still 
views CRAs as subject to the same commercial speech standards, however, 
is unclear.  Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through 
its own administrative rulings,33 appears to blur the line between commercial 
and core, highly protected forms of speech, to which the courts have 
acquiesced.  At a minimum, nearly all federal courts have been reluctant to 
impose liability for damages incurred by investors’ reliance on CRAs’ 
“opinions,”34 a description which protects CRAs from the professional 
malpractice liabilities imposed upon other “expert” industries.35  Ultimately, 
“The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether speech by a 
[CRA] regarding the credit rating of an issue or issue of securities is fully 
protected speech or commercial speech”36––securities being financial 
instruments of extraordinary salience in the fraught public discourse 
unleashed by the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession. 
 28.  QuadCapital Advisors, LLC, Rating Agency Credit Scale (2017), 
http://www.quadcapital.com/resources/credit-rating-scales. 
 29.  Fitch Ratings, Inc., Ratings Definitions (2017), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/definitions.  
 30.  See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (pharmaceutical advertising); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) 
(contraceptives advertising); Cent. Hundson Gas & Electric Corp. 447 U.S. at 561–64 (electric 
utility advertising).
 31.  Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
 32.  Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).  
 33.  See, e.g., SEC Written Consents Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2014) (“providing the 
[CRAs] with an exemption from liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false 
or misleading statements in a registration statement”).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. for the basic 
S.E.C. framework for registration requirements for securities issuances under the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1933 (hereinafter “the Act”). 
 34.  But see Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) discussed infra at Part IV(A)(2).  
 35.  See generally Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Adam Shamir, & Tomas Jodar, Below Investment 
Grade and Above the Law: A Past, Present and Future Look at the Accountability of Credit Rating 
Agencies, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1063 (2012); Bailey, supra note 26 at 277–78, 287–94 
(highlighting financial advisors, auditors, and security analysts, among other professions exposed 
to liability).  
 36.  Bailey, supra note 26, at 291.  
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E.  The Supreme Court Distinguishes Opinions from Statements 
of Facts – An Extant Framework for CRA Ratings in 
Litigation
Nearly four decades after Lowe and Greenmoss Builders, a more-recent 
case has diminished their resonance and usefulness for post-crisis 
assessments of CRAs’ actions and potential liability: Omnicare, Inc. v. 
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund
(“Omnicare”).37  In that case, a group of pension funds sued Omnicare, a 
pharmacy company specializing in nursing home resident services, after the 
federal government disclosed investigations of the company’s involvement 
in alleged kickback schemes under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 
Securities and Exchange Act’s Section 11.38  In Omnicare’s registration 
statements—required to issue securities under the Act, as well as the basis 
for the pension funds’ claims against the company—two statements averred 
that the company’s contracting arrangements were in accordance with state 
and federal law.39  Both statements began with “We believe,” a framing 
viewed both by Omnicare and by the reviewing, unanimous U.S. Supreme 
Court majority as reflections of opinion––not misstatements of “fact,” as 
required by the Act to trigger liability.40
In writing the majority opinion, however, Justice Kagan elaborated on 
the distinctions between “opinion” statements and “statements of fact,” a 
distinction which is not obviously binary.  The baseline definition for “a 
statement of fact” is a statement which “expresses certainty about a thing, 
whereas a statement of opinion . . . does not.”41  Hence, statements which 
begin “I believe” or “we think” appear to fall under the latter category–pure 
opinions which cannot trigger liability under securities laws and regulations.  
There are exceptions of crucial importance; careful couching of disclosures’ 
phrasing is no panacea and even “opinions” may be treated as factual 
statements in at least three situations.  First, an erstwhile opinion statement 
may not protect the speaker from liability when they know their stated belief 
(e.g., “I believe our securities offer the best returns in this market segment”) 
is erroneous (e.g., the speaker knows their securities’ returns are not the 
best).42  Second, opinions which necessarily “contain embedded statements 
 37.  Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 
(2015).
 38.  Id. at 1318–24.   
 39.  Id. at 1323.  
 40.  Id.
 41.  Id. at 1325 (emphasis added). 
 42.  Id. at 1326–27.  
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of fact” within them may provide a cause of action under securities laws and 
regulations.43  In these scenarios, a statement may no longer be an “opinion” 
if the speaker follows “I believe” with “because,” then one or multiple 
factual assertions justifying the speaker’s belief.44  Third, and finally, 
evidence demonstrating a speaker’s stated opinion was not sincerely held—
i.e., the speaker was dishonest, irrespective of having expressed pure opinion 
or an opinion with embedded factual assertions—clearly implicates the 
possibility of liability under state or federal antifraud laws.45
Of course, the CRAs are exempt from the Act’s Section 11 
requirements, meaning the Omnicare framework may not be applied directly 
to the CRAs without impinging upon the SEC’s regulatory directives.46
Nonetheless, if the Supreme Court opts to harmonize 1980s-era precedents 
and the more-recent Omnicare, as it should, then the CRAs should be wary 
about judicial review of their crisis-era conduct, whether under the SEC Act 
or under general federal and state antifraud laws.  For the CRAs, either 
approach is cause for concern after a decade of post-crisis analysis and 
particularly damning insider admissions.47
 43.   Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct.at 1327.  
 44.  Id. (referencing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1109 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).  
 45.  Id.
 46.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77a. 
 47.  The U.S. Congress-commissioned Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s Final Report 
catalogues voluminous examples.  Among other warning signs which implicate the CRAs are the 
shifting lending standards for mortgage borrowers leading into the crisis; the longstanding, 
prototypical borrower putting 20% of a home’s value into a down payment became less common 
as lenders accepted ever-lower payment amounts and offered mortgages covering ever-higher 
percentages of borrowers’ mortgages.  FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 109–10 (Jan. 2011) (hereinafter “FCIC
REP.”).  In the run-up to the crisis, some lenders required no upfront collateral whatsoever, instead 
providing multiple mortgages to the same buyer to cover the entire cost of the home.  Id. at 110.  
Those borrowers then had no equity in their own homes, a major problem once prices began to drop 
in lockstep with a deteriorating national economy––those zero-equity borrowers would have more 
difficulty paying their mortgage obligations (as incomes leveled or declined, work hours decreased, 
and layoffs spread early in the crisis) and, therefore, face risks of defaulting on two mortgages 
simultaneously. Id.  The tendency for these defaults to be geographically proximate—even within 
the same neighborhoods, or on the very same streets—amplified these risks by ensuring these types 
of borrowers could not sell their homes in oversaturated, declining markets.  Id.  At the same time, 
underwriting and borrower–documentation standards loosened, especially for the riskiest subprime 
borrowers with poor credit and high relative default risks; lenders, in egregious cases, merely 
confirmed employment information provided by applicants, but no longer required proof of 
income. Id.  The twofold pattern of increasing mortgage debts without equity/collateral and 
decreasing underwriting/documentation standards became widespread throughout U.S. housing 
markets–and well-known to insiders.  Id. at 111.  Citigroup’s Richard Bowen testified after the 
crash that bankers were aware of these trends: “A decision was made that ‘We’re going to have to 
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Essentially, this Note advocates for the abovementioned harmonizing 
strategy in a manner consistent with fundamental constitutional principles 
above all––i.e., affirming existing First Amendment doctrines and properly 
classifying CRAs’ ratings opinions within them, rather than as a wholly 
unique outlier.  As long as the written consents rule holds,48 then reviewing 
courts–and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular––ought not to confer overly 
expansive First Amendment-based protections for the CRAs’ bubble-era 
misconduct, nor should the Court retain expansive guards against liability in 
case of future systemic financial crises.  At most, CRAs’ opinions, which 
necessarily rely upon embedded factual claims and which are the “product” 
for which securities issuers pay fees to the agencies, match the existing 
rubrics of commercial speech doctrine best.  Ratings, ultimately, are 
“speech” and a “commercial transaction” rolled into one, not representations 
of ideological or political “core” speech.49  For specific contexts, like the 
widespread, still-ongoing post-crisis litigation involving the CRAs,50 an 
Omnicare-style approach with case-by-case assessments of CRAs’ 
knowledge should provide the focal legal issues upon review.  More broadly, 
policy-focused resolutions to this doctrinal morass should include exploring 
new SEC rule-making to strike the written consents carve-out for the CRAs 
as well as other means of harmonizing regulatory doctrines across industries 
(e.g., securities issuers, CRAs, mortgage lenders, and others involved in the 
housing and financial services sectors).   
hold our nose . . . if we want to stay in business.”  Id.  Former banking regulator William Black 
called “low-documentation” or “no-documentation” loans “an ‘open invitation to fraud,’” 
colloquially known as “liar’s loans.”  Id. at 110–11.  CRA insiders’ testimonials provide little help.  
A Moody’s director testified: “We had to be looking for a problem [e.g., in the underlying risks of 
the mortgages they securitized and rated].  And we weren’t looking.”  Id. at 147.  CRAs, among 
other finance institutions, received growing numbers of warnings from regulators and watchdog 
groups around the world in the years immediately preceding the crash as well, with the Bank of 
International Settlements cautioning insiders about widespread defects in financial models 
(understating default risks and correlation risks systematically) as well as potentially disastrous 
consequences–all nearly a year before Bear Stearns collapsed.  Id. at 148.  
 48.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77a. 
 49.  See supra notes 13-20 and corresponding discussion. 
 50.  See, e.g., Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Reaches $2.09 Billion Settlement Over Mortgage-
Backed Securities, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-agrees-
to-2-09-billion-settlement-for-crisis-era-mortgage-loans-1533147302.  
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II.  The Global Financial Crisis and CRAs: Intermediaries, 
Gatekeepers, Accelerants 
A.  The Rapid Rise of the American Housing Sector and 
Mortgage Securitization Before the Crisis 
For at least the last three decades, the American housing sector has been 
a key locus of financial sector innovations, including the rise of securitized 
mortgages and related, increasingly complex financial investment 
instruments.  Securitized mortgages developed rapidly after the savings and 
loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, ostensibly as instruments for mitigating and 
transferring or distributing the very financial risks which drove the earlier 
S&L crisis itself.  Between the Great Depression and the early 1980s, S&Ls 
provided substantial sources of mortgage financing around the country, 
typically in the form of “traditional fixed-rate, 30-year mortgages.”51  The 
S&Ls combined three essential functions—origination, service, and 
holding52 of mortgage loans in their portfolios—but they also “were largely 
prohibited from offering adjustable-rate mortgages [ARMs] or hedging their 
interest-rate risk through the use of derivatives.”53  As such, when the 
economy faltered in the late 1970s, a chain of policy choices and market 
shifts proved disastrous.  In response to rising inflation, “short-term interest 
rates rose rapidly [during the late 1970s], and the yield curve inverted, with 
short-term rates exceeding longer-term rates.”54  With S&Ls holding nearly 
 51.  Franklin Allen, James R. Barth, & Glenn Yago, Financial Innovations and the Stability 
of the Housing Market, 230 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 16, 28 (2014).  
 52.  In the archetypal model, a “mortgage loan . . . is a loan secured by the collateral of some 
specified real estate property [e.g., a residential home], which obliges the borrower [homebuyer] to 
make a predetermined series of repayments” to the lender which provides the financing.  Frank J. 
Fabozzi & David Yuen, Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities 333, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (Frank J. Fabozzi ed. 2002).  In exchange, the “mortgage gives the 
[lender the] right . . . to ‘foreclose’ on the loan and seize the property” if the borrower defaults on 
the prearranged repayments.  Id.  Thus, in the stylized and simplified approach, when a potential 
homebuyer decides to purchase a home, for instance, they apply for a mortgage loan with an orig-
inator, who, for a transaction fee, “performs a credit valuation for the applicant” and assesses their 
ability to repay the loan amount, given their income relative to the loan amount, as well as the value 
of the referent home vis-à-vis comparable properties in the area.  Id.  Once the mortgage is ap-
proved, the originator sends the approval to a financial institution (prototypically a bank or credit 
union), which acts as the lender–i.e., processes and pays out the loan amount, while “holding” the 
mortgage on their books.  Id. at 333–34.  S&Ls, however, combined each of these functions, over-
exposing those institutions to default risks of homebuyers in the (inevitable) case of a housing 
sector downturn or recession, as occurred in the 1980s.  Id.
 53.  Allen, Barth & Yago, supra note 51, at 28. 
 54.  Id.
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half of all US mortgages in their portfolios—with fixed, 30-year terms—the 
sharp, sudden interest rate hikes meant thousands of these institutions 
became functionally insolvent, with an industry-wide shortfall of 
approximately $150 billion ($417 billion in 2011 dollars).55  Lacking ARMs, 
S&Ls’ mortgages became unmarketable, since new mortgage-backed 
investment assets and government-issued bonds instantly became the safer, 
preferred options among most investors. 
Consequently, a more-distributed, decentralized system of financial 
institutions—with novel financing tools offered to would-be homebuyers—
emerged after the mid-1980s.56  Fixed-rate, 30-year mortgages remained a 
benchmark, but ARMs, subprime loans, and “hybrid” loans quickly 
expanded as a proportion of all mortgage financing approaches nationally.  
The variable nature of these loans, both in terms of their interest rates and 
the associated financial risks (e.g., the mortgagees’ default risks), provided 
“[mortgages] which featured low introductory interest rates for two or three 
years but a higher rate thereafter.  This financial innovation was fine [but 
only] as long as home prices continued to rise.”57  Therein lies the key 
structural defect that proved so disastrous for homeowners, lenders, and the 
overall economy over the decades which followed. 
B.  Historical Overview of America’s CRAs Through 2007: The 
Gatekeepers Become Innovators 
Throughout the rise of structured finance and securitization since the 
early 1990s, CRAs became deeply linked to increasingly diverse, 
enormously complex financial instruments.58  These instruments notably 
included various forms of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs),59
 55.  Allen, Barth & Yago, supra note 51, at 28. 
 56.  Id.
 57.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 58.  Hunt, supra note 27, at 117–18.   
 59.  MBS emerged in the 1980s amid rapid changes in the banking, housing, and financial 
services sectors.  MBS “are financial assets, which, if publicly issued, are traded in an open mar-
ket,” innovatively allowing investors to disaggregate mortgages—both residential and commer-
cial—whereas before mortgage securitization, investors could only deal with entire mortgages at 
once; see David J. Hartzell, Andrea Lepcio, Julia D. Fernald, & Susan Jordan, Commercial Mort-
gage-Backed Securities: An Investor’s Primer, 6 HOUS. FIN. REV. 169, 170–71 (1987).  From their 
inception, MBS are distinct from other, earlier forms of securities in that they are backed “by a 
pool” of assets, i.e., physical properties upon which the securities’ values are based.  While there 
are many types of MBS, the two main types for present purposes are “agency-backed MBS,” i.e., 
MBS backed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s guarantees, such as those created and sold 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and “non-agency” MBS, which are issued by other financial 
institutions engaged in the housing sector.  Frank J. Fabozzi & David Yuen, Agency Mortgage-
Backed Securities in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 331, 333 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed. 
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collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs),60 collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs)61 and a range of credit default swaps (CDSs)62 and 
complex derivatives,63 among others.  CDSs developed as a means for 
2002).  Sometimes, MBS backed by a pool of commercial properties, i.e., income-generating build-
ings from offices and hotels to industrial sites, are called “commercial MBS,” or “CMBS.”  Joseph 
F. DeMichele, William J. Adams, & Duane C. Hewlett, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 399 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed. 2002).  
 60.  The genesis of CMOs was aimed at mitigating investment risks inherent in MBS by di-
viding securities’ payouts from the underlying mortgage pool across a classified or hierarchical 
structure of investor levels called “tranches.”  Each CMO tranche is organized according to the risk 
profiles of the underlying assets (e.g., according to the risk of default or nonpayment for the mort-
gages contained in the pool).  Fabozzi & Yuen, supra note 59, at 356.  In fine, the effects of 
CMOs—the effects of collateralizing or pooling mortgages of varied risk profiles—were distribu-
tional, rather than risk-eliminating: they shifted risks across broader ranges of investors, only.  Id.
Thus, CMOs had systemic effects on financial and housing markets in the U.S. and globally: “The 
CMO’s major financial innovation is that the securities created more closely satisfy the asset/lia-
bility needs of institutional investors and thus broaden the appeal of mortgage-backed products 
to . . . investors.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
 61.  CDOs similarly emerged after the S&L crisis of the 1980s, a novel financial innovation 
which added one step beyond the pooling of CMOs (see supra note 46).  CDOs added diversifica-
tion to the securitization process, combining pools of assets across multiple industries, rather than 
just mortgages.  Laurie S. Goodman & Frank J. Fabozzi, Collateralized Debt Obligations, in THE
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 483–84 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed. 2002).  CMOs include, 
inter alia, “corporate bonds, bank loans, sovereign bonds, and [MBS/CMBS],” among other types 
of underlying assets.  Id. at 484.  Although CDOs aimed to contain various forms of risks through 
diversification–securities which derive their value from a range of industries, such that a downturn 
in one sector (e.g., residential housing) could be offset by maintained strength in another (e.g., the 
sovereign bond market for emerging economies), thus preventing widespread losses––but as is a 
truism in the field of finance, risk can never be fully eliminated.  Indeed, nearly a decade before the 
financial crash, commentators noted the pivotal role of credit rating agencies in evaluating the un-
derlying risks to prevent widespread defaults or contagion: “The biggest risk [for CMOs and other 
pooled securities] . . . is a sudden decline in the value of the collateral pool.  Thus, the [CRAs] focus 
on the price volatility and liquidity of the [underlying] assets” in their analyses and ratings assign-
ments.” Id. at 494.  See generally DeMichele, Adams, & Hewlett, supra note 59, at 417–19.  
 62.  Swaps, including credit default swaps, refer to agreements between two parties to “swap” 
risks across their respective portfolios–i.e., they contractually agree to a predetermined “exchange 
of a schedule of cash flows over a specified” duration, which can run from as little as a few months 
to as long as a decade.  Bruce M. Collins & Frank J. Fabozzi, Equity Derivatives, in THE
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 723, 752 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed. 2002).  Swaps are useful 
tools for mitigating risks when an investor or a company is overexposed to a particular industry or 
commodity.  For example, an airline company likely is exposed to risks associated with fuel costs, 
since oil prices are volatile and oil is an essential commodity in the airline sector.  Thus, an airline 
may wish to “swap” their exposure to the energy sector with another company operating in another 
line of business without exposure to the same sector.  In other contexts, swaps are advantageous 
when a firm or investor wishes to hedge their foreign exchange risks (e.g., using currency swaps to 
offset possible losses from fluctuating currency values in global markets) or to gain access to for-
eign currency if they wish to expand business in a new market abroad.  Id. at 753.  
 63.  Derivatives, most generally, are “contracts that essentially derive their value from the 
behavior of cash market instruments such as stocks, stock indexes, bonds, currencies, and com-
modities that underlie the [derivative] contracts.”  Collins & Fabozzi, supra note 62, at 723.  De-
rivatives thus refer to a class of financial instruments, all ostensibly aimed at benefits like offsetting 
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companies and investors to offset the default risks of their portfolios by 
“swapping” those risks with other companies and investors, analogous to 
insurance contracts.64  As with those contracts, the holder of a CDS “pay[s] 
premiums over time” on the swap, such that, if the entity underlying the swap 
“does not default . . . the premiums” are lost; however, if the default event 
occurs, “the credit default swap allows [the owner] to exchange [it] for the 
principal amount of the bonds, or alternatively, depending on the details of 
the contract, for a payment equal to the principal amount . . . minus their 
current value at the time of default.”65  As such, two companies may hold 
swaps—e.g., one company with widespread exposure to the automotive 
sector and another company with widespread exposures in an industry which 
performs conversely with automotive sector performance—and thus offset 
their respective risk exposures.  Importantly, though, CDSs have two main 
differences vis-à-vis insurance contracts: First, the owner of a CDS need not 
hold the bonds underlying the swap, unlike with insurance contracts, where 
one “typically [must] have a direct economic exposure to obtain insurance” 
and, second, CDSs are tradable in markets, unlike most insurance contracts.66
The market for CDSs ballooned most prolifically over just two decades: 
“The first CDSs were traded by JP Morgan in 1995” and, by 2001, their total 
market value was just under $919 billion; by 2007, at the market’s pre-crash 
zenith, this value had ballooned to over $62 trillion.67  The CRAs’ ratings 
reach far beyond securities, including sovereign debt ratings—assessments 
of creditworthiness for foreign countries’ investment bonds68—and
traditional, less-risky corporate bonds.69  Nonetheless, it is these classes of 
investment risks via diversification and hedging, easing transaction costs and information flows, 
and other functions akin to securities.  Id. at 723–24.  Derivatives include instruments such as fu-
tures and forwards (predetermined, binding agreements to transact over defined commodities or 
investments in the future at pre-specified prices), options (like futures and forwards, but elective–
i.e., the parties to such a contract are not bound to execute the agreement), and various forms of 
swaps. Id. at 725, 741, 752–53.  For present purposes, this Note uses the term “structured finance” 
to refer to all the foregoing financial instruments which proliferated in the wake of the S&L crisis 
of the 1980s, from traditional securities to the most complex derivatives, for parsimony.  Exceptions 
to this catch-all term are noted expressly otherwise.  
 64.  René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 
(2010).
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id.
 67.  Robert A. Jarrow, The Economics of Credit Default Swaps, 3 ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON.
235, 236 (2011). 
 68.  Glen Biglaiser & Joseph L. Staats, Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign 
Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law,
66 INT’L ORG. 515 (2012). 
 69.  See Aysun Alp, Structural Shifts in Credit Rating Standards, 68 J. FINANCE 2435 (2013). 
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financial instruments which garnered particularly widespread attention in the 
wake of the crisis.70
The manifold roles of CRAs, both in the spread of the American 
housing bubble of the 2000s and in the extremity of the ensuing financial 
crisis, are well-documented.  Looking just to CRAs’ assessments of MBSs 
and related instruments is illustrative.  In the run-up to the crisis, a 
constellation of actors in the financial services sector relied upon faulty 
assumptions about market fundamentals––traditional commercial banks 
(providing mortgage loans to homebuyers); investment banks and hedge 
funds (“securitizing” these loans, i.e., packaging them into new investment 
instruments which could be bought and sold on the market); and the CRAs 
(assessing the risk profiles for all these investment instruments).71
Disastrously, and in addition to the implicit assumption of perpetual home 
value growth mentioned above, these financial institutions assumed the risks 
of homeowners defaulting on their mortgages were uncorrelated, meaning 
there was only marginal risk of “contagion.”72  To make matters worse, the 
increased complexity of securitization spread the contagion across diverse 
segments of the global economy: collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
combined numerous mortgages of mixed risk profiles, including the riskiest 
subprime mortgages most likely to default, while the entirely unregulated 
 70.  See generally Stulz, supra note 64. 
 71.  See MICHEL CROUHY, DAN GALAI & ROBERT MARK, THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCIAL 
RISK MANAGEMENT 82–84, 88 (2nd ed. 2014). 
 72.  For illustration, this means that a single default–one homeowner in a neighborhood be-
coming unable to pay their monthly mortgage, thus losing their home (and invested equity) to the 
holder of the debt, often a bank or other institutional investor–would have no discernible effect on 
neighboring homeowners.  Several factors ensured that mortgage defaults were highly correlated 
instead: ARMs were common financing/repayment structures for the riskiest (i.e., “subprime”) 
mortgages, and after a period of zero or near-zero interest rates, the ARMs would adjust upward, 
often dramatically.  In a neighborhood constructed quickly and speculatively, with many lower-
income, lower-credit, typically first-time homebuyers, the ARM interest rates spiked almost sim-
ultaneously, leading to widespread defaults.  Even among those who could afford to maintain their 
mortgage payments, once defaults and foreclosures began destroying home values in an area, at-
tempts to sell remaining homes accelerated the crisis.  See, e.g., John Hull & Alan White, The Risk 
of Tranches Created from Mortgages, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 54 (2010); Bruce I. Jacobs, Tumbling 
Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17 (2009); 
Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. 
Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1449 (2009) (arguing from ZIP code-level analysis that 
the highest-risk “subprime” locales experienced the greatest expansion in credit access in the years 
immediately preceding the financial crisis, such that income growth and mortgage credit growth 
actually were negatively correlated from 2002 to 2005); Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 
The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1967 (2010) 
(demonstrating that U.S. congressional representatives’ voting on peak-crisis legislation correlates 
highly with the localized effects of the default crisis in their districts over the short term).   
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CDS market exploded.73  Coupled with private behaviors in the bubble years 
before 2007, such as escalating individual and household debts, the use of 
properties as a form of “leverage” for everyday homeowners, the prevalence 
of these exotic instruments in retirement accounts, and so on, the contagion 
sprawled quickly, far beyond Wall Street icons and into every corner of the 
U.S. and many global economies.74
As these financial sector innovations developed, the major U.S. CRAs 
expanded their traditional gatekeeping and information-transmission roles in 
lockstep, leading to sharp criticism in numerous post-mortem analyses of the 
bubble and crash.  The CRAs not only provided advice to producers of these 
instruments under the guise of ex ante risk-mitigation, but they also routinely 
lavished “AAA” (extremely safe) ratings on many of the resulting 
instruments, including those containing the riskiest debts.75  Systematically 
questionable assessments of products at least partially designed and then 
speciously rated by the CRAs drew sharp condemnation from lawmakers in 
the aftermath of the crisis: “[M]ajor firms and investors blindly relied on 
[CRAs] as their arbiters of risk.  What else could one expect on a highway 
where there were neither speed limits nor neatly painted lines?”76  Indeed, 
once the U.S. housing market slowed and prices in overheated, speculation-
driven markets plateaued, before plummeting, the economy swerved over 
the hidden “lines”–and over a cliff. 
 73. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 71; see also John M. Griffin, Jordan Nickerson & Dragon Y. 
Tang, Rating Shopping or Catering? An Examination of the Response to Competitive Pressure for 
CDO Credit Ratings, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2270 (2013).  
 74.  See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Great Recession: Lessons from Microeconomic Data,
100 AM. ECON. REV. 51 (2010).  
 75.  FCIC REP., supra note 47.  
 76.  Id. at xvii.  
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C.  Systemic Crisis Claims Victims: AIG, Lehman, and Bear 
Stearns
In addition to erasing vast sums of household wealth and equity,77 the 
financial crisis claimed among its victims three of Wall Street’s largest 
institutions: Bear Stearns, AIG, and Lehman Brothers.78
In the early twenty-first century, Bear Stearns had a sterling reputation 
among America’s “most-admired” securities industry leaders,79 and as of late 
2007, following its peak, employed approximately 15,500 workers across 
dozens of global offices,80 and was one of the largest securities firms in the 
world.  Bear Stearns held over $400 billion in capital and total assets in the 
years before the crisis, but the firm’s capital structure was radically 
imbalanced: in addition to its cash and assets, Bear Stearns held over $13 
trillion in derivatives contracts as of 2007; a net equity valuation of just over 
$11 billion against total assets of $396 billion; and balance sheets flooded 
with highly illiquid, often “junk” assets in the deteriorating subprime 
mortgage market.81  The firm’s troubles came to light nearly a year before 
its ultimate collapse, when several of its managed hedge funds had to be 
bailed out by the company after the underlying assets’ values began to dive.82
After failed attempts to salvage or liquidate suddenly worthless assets, with 
other financial sector actors paying pennies on the dollar––or outright 
refusing to take on Bear Stearns’s toxic assets at all–the firm’s outlook turned 
into a panic and, over little more than a single week in early March 2008, the 
stock value crashed dramatically.83  The first major institutional casualty of 
 77.  Losses “from fraud on mortgage loans made between 2005 and 2007” alone amounted to 
at least $112 billion; even stagnant markets experiencing zero or negative population growth—such 
as Cleveland, Ohio—experienced wild surges in home values despite doubling foreclosure rates 
from the mid-1900s through the early 2000s.  The ultimate financial and economic effects proved 
disastrous: 3.6 million jobs were lost in 2008 alone, with 4.7 million more through the end of 2009; 
unemployment rates jumped from 8.8% to 13.7% from December 2007 to December 2008, while 
“the underemployment rate stood at 17%” by November 2010.  An estimated $17 trillion—nearly 
$3 trillion more than the entire U.S. GDP in 2008—in U.S. household net wealth was lost between 
2007 and 2009.  Id. at xxii, 9–10, 390–91.  
 78.  Allana M. Grinshteyn, Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: The Dodd-Frank Act’s (Almost) 
Attack on Credit Rating Agencies, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 937–38 (2010).   
 79.  America’s Most Admired Companies 2007 – Fortune, CNN MONEY (2007), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2007/industries/industry_52.html.  
 80.  Tim McLaughlin, Bear Stearns to Cut 650 Jobs Globally, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2007), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bearstearns-jobs/bear-stearns-to-cut-650-jobs-globally-idUSN 
2861070720071128.  
 81.  Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE (Mar. 31, 2008), archive.for-
tune.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd_bear.fortune/index.htm.  
 82.  Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/08/bear_stearns200808.  
 83.  Boyd, supra note 81. 
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the subprime mortgage meltdown and credit crisis received an urgently 
needed infusion of $30 billion from its eventual bargain-buyer, JPMorgan 
Chase, which was “backstopped” and underwritten by the U.S. 
government84––effectively marking the first of the bailouts, though 
providing only a faint vision of the massive rescue efforts to come. 
The first alarm bells went off amid the collapse and failure of Bear 
Stearns, but they quickly rang out in other areas of the U.S. economy as well.  
Before the crisis, AIG was “the then largest insurance company in the United 
States . . . [with] 2007 earnings of $6.20 billion” and a stock price in 
February 2008 of $50.15 a share.85  AIG held roughly $1 trillion in assets, 
nearly $96 billion in shareholders’ equity, yet it almost entirely collapsed–– 
requiring $182.5 billion in government aid through 2009, while its stock 
traded below $1.00 per share in the year after the bailouts.86  Lehman 
Brothers––even more extraordinarily––became the largest bankruptcy filing 
in the world history, with $592 billion in assets as of September 2008;87
given Lehman’s central position in the financial systems of dozens of 
countries, more than 80 international insolvency cases unfolded concurrently 
worldwide.88  In further groundbreaking moves, Lehman’s failure was 
notably striking not only for its rapid pace, but also for the dynamics leading 
to the landmark bankruptcy: while the “government had committed about 
$30 billion to supporting JPMorgan Chase’s . . . takeover of Bearn Stearns” 
and nearly $200 billion in the effective public takeovers of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, potential eleventh-hour buyers for Lehman’s enormous assets 
“had little time to inspect” their “toxic assets,” and so could not agree to a 
purchase deal which sufficiently allayed their concerns.89
Against the backdrop of these massive losses was a longstanding 
pattern of massive risk-taking among the nation’s largest banks.  After 30 
years of progressive deregulation of financial markets and institutions, the 
largest among them “borrowed [money] to the hilt, leaving them vulnerable 
to financial distress or ruin if the value of their investments declined even 
 84.  Boyd, supra note 81. See generally Vincent Reinhart, A Year of Living Dangerously: 
The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2011).  
 85.  William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 943 (2009).   
 86.  Id.
 87.  Emily Lee, Investor Protection in Lehman Brothers’ Insolvency Litigation [Research 
Comment], 7 J. COMP. L. 284 (2012).   
 88.  Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 297, 
298–99 (2014).   
 89.  Eric Dash, 5 Days of Pressure, Fear and Ultimately, Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/business/16reconstruct.html?action=click&contentCollec-
tion=Business%20Day&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article.  
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 141 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 141 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
CARR_MACROED FINAL 10.4.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2018 6:27 PM
266 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
modestly.”90  These institutions borrowed heavily against “extraordinarily 
thin capital” to such an extent that several had “leverage ratios . . . as high as 
40 to 1” just before the crash––“meaning for every $40 in assets, there was 
only $1 in capital to cover losses,” and a mere “3% drop in asset values 
could” make such over-leveraged firms insolvent overnight.91  In year 
following the collapse of Bear Stearns, financial institutions collectively––
including commercial banks, insurers, government-sponsored enterprises, 
brokers and dealers, and hedge funds––lost in excess of $1 trillion by March 
2009, an estimate which likely understated the true extent of all losses.92
Even while Fannie, Freddie, and AIG were saved by direct federal 
injections of massive public funding, and the “shotgun marriage[s]” of Bear 
Stearns with JPMorgan and Bank of America with Merrill Lynch prevented 
the total dissolution of these trillion-dollar institutions93, Lehman was forced 
to file for bankruptcy on September 15, leaving 25,000 employees to clear 
out their Manhattan offices and stock markets plunging around the globe.  
Lehman’s dramatic collapse prompted then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan to remark, “It’s a once-in-a-century type of financial crisis,” 
warning that other institutions were likely to tumble.94  In the following 
weeks, Congress considered––and the House of Representatives initially 
rejected––a $700 billion bank bailout plan, fueling the dramatic stock market 
selloff on September 29, 2008: the Dow plummeted 778 points, “the biggest 
single-day point loss ever” at the time, while S&P dropped by 8.8%, and 
Nasdaq by 9.1%, cumulatively erasing $1.2 trillion in total market value.95
 90.  FCIC REP., supra note 47, at xix.   
 91.  Further, “much of their borrowing was short-term, in the overnight market—meaning the 
borrowing had to be renewed each and every day.”  This pattern of borrowing exacerbated systemic 
risks, with the Commission noting that the borrowing habits of these institutions “was the equiva-
lent of a small business with $50,000 in equity borrowing $1.6 million, with $296,750 of that due” 
to lenders daily–a pattern repeated across all major investment banks, including Bear Stearns, Gold-
man Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, only one of which survived 
intact, without being purchased, merged, or entering bankruptcy in toto.  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, in extremis, increased their leverage ratios as high as 75 to 1 by 2007, outpacing investment 
banks’ and private households’ extensive accumulation of debts in the run-up to 2008.  Id. at xix–xx.   
 92.  Zhiguo He, In Gu Khang, & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Balance Sheet Adjustments during 
the 2008 Crisis, 55 IMF ECON. REV. 118, 123 (2010).  
 93.  Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Loosens Standards on Emergency Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
2008, at A19, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15fed.html?action=click&contentCollec-
tion=Business%20Day&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article.  
 94.  Adam Shell, Matt Krantz, Sue Kirchhoff, John Waggoner & Kathy Chu, Lehman Bros. 
Files for Bankruptcy Protection, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=5805 
288&page=1.  
 95.  Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed, CNN MONEY, Sept. 28, 2008,  http://money.cnn.com 
/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/ (noting not only the macro figures from the stock markets, 
but also the collapse of consumer spending throughout the spreading financial crisis, including the 
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The unspooling of America’s largest financial institutions further crippled 
lending, leading to a deep “credit freeze” that made even routine lending for 
unremarkable business expenses nearly impossible in the last quarter of 
2008.96  This confluence of loosened regulatory standards, increased 
individual risk-taking by financial institutions, and systemic risks amplified 
by “flawed models of valuation and risk assessment,” among other factors,97
produced extensive academic and policy debate,98 though consensus on both 
causes and cures remains elusive nearly a decade later.99  The following 
soon-defunct Wachovia Bank [shares down 81% in a single day of trading] and technology giant 
Apple, off almost 18%, among other tech-sector firms like Intel, IBM, and HP, illustrating the 
endogeneity issues between business financing availability, consumer confidence/spending, and 
overall economic health; even then “safe” commodities like oil experienced their “single-biggest” 
daily price drops in history).  
 96.  The “credit freeze” resulted from banks’ reluctance to lend money during the height of 
the financial crisis, including a refusal to extend new lines of credit or instituting “more onerous 
terms” for offerings; in practice, since “[most] businesses don’t keep much cash on hand” as a 
matter of course, payroll and customer credit lines felt an immediate balance sheet crunch, sending 
“the economy into a tailspin” as feared by economists as events unfolded, Tami Luhby, Credit
Freeze and Your Paycheck, CNN MONEY, Sept. 28, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/ 
09/28/news/economy/main_street_impact/index.htm?postversion=2008092811.   
 97.  See, e.g., Yiting Li, Guillaume Rocheteau & Pierre-Olivier Weill, Liquidity and the 
Threat of Fraudulent Assets, 120 J. POL. ECON. 815 (2012) (discussing the prevalence and effects 
of fraudulent practices in over-the-counter markets).  
 98.  See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 72; Mian et al., supra note 72; Ing-Haw Cheng, Sahil Raina 
& Wei Xiong, Wall Street and the Housing Bubble, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2797 (2014); Lloyd 
Dixon, Noreen Clancy & Krishna B. Kumar, RAND CORP., Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis 
of 2007-2008, in HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 39 (2012); James Grant, After the Crash: 
Helping the U.S. Economy Right Itself, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 141 (2008); Alan Greenspan, Never Saw 
It Coming: Why the Financial Crisis Took Economists by Surprise, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 88 (2013); 
Sue Konzelmann, Frank Wilkinson, Marc Fovargue-Davies & Duncan Sankey, Governance, Reg-
ulation and Financial Market Instability: The Implications for Policy, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
929, 944–45 (2010); Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Finan-
cial Crisis, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (2011); Alan D. Morrison, Systemic Risks and the ‘Too-Big-To-
Fail’ Problem, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 498 (2011); Fabian T. Pfeffer, Sheldon Danziger & 
Robert F. Schoeni, Wealth Disparities Before and After the Great Recession, 650 ANNALS OF THE 
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (2013); Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Credit Booms 
Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, 102 AM. ECON.
REV. 1029 (2012); Chelsea Wald, Crazy Money, 322 SCIENCE 1624 (2008). 
 99.  See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Asset Prices, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1486 (2014); 
Richard Roll, The Possible Misdiagnosis of a Crisis, 67 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12 (2011); Maha Atal, 
Banker: “TARP Helped Avert a Global Calamity, FORTUNE, July 23, 2009, http://archive.for-
tune.com/2009/07/23/news/companies/tarp_banks_new_york_mellon.fortune/index.htm; Eugene 
Fama, Robert C. Merton, & Myron Scholes, Bursting Bubbles: Finance, Crisis and the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis, in THE PROFIT DOCTRINE (Robert Chernomas & Ian Hudson, eds., 2017) (clas-
sically neoliberal view, arguing that ineffective and over-involved governmental regulation, not 
systemic market problems, are the root of the crisis); John B. Taylor, The Role of Policy in the 
Great Recession and the Weak Recovery, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 61 (2014); Alana Semuels, The 
Places That May Never Recover From The Recession, ATLANTIC, Jan. 2, 2018, https://www.theat-
lantic.com/business/archive/2017/12/suburban-poverty-and-recession/549350/ (cataloguing U.S. 
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sections explore the regulatory challenges and shortcomings of the pre-crash 
era, focusing especially on the early 2000s and how a series of legal changes 
primed the American financial system for repeated crises.  The final section 
of Part III reviews recent deregulatory legislative proposals considering this 
historical overview of crisis triggers. 
D.  Pre-Crash Regulatory Shortcomings Come to a Head 
The federal government’s response to the financial crisis and Great 
Recession followed earlier attempts at reform which, in the phrasing of one 
understated reflection, “proved insufficient.”100  Most notably among these 
earlier reforms was the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), passed following 
the accounting scandals of Enron and Worldcom, among others.101  The SOX 
required publicly traded corporations to certify the accuracy of quarterly 
statements filed with the SEC, ensuring that they do “not contain any untrue 
statements or omit any material facts,” while imposing procedural and 
auditing requirements more generally.102  The SOX also required disclosure 
of “the number and names of persons serving” public corporations’ audit 
committees, aiming to “make sure that the board . . . includes some members 
who are experts in understanding financial reports.”103  While these essential 
reforms improved transparency and put public companies on notice in the 
wake of the accounting scandals at the turn of the millennium, the narrow 
focus of the law—excluding most private corporations––and the emphasis 
on curbing “inattention and incompetence as much as deliberate 
malfeasance,”104 ignored the foregoing, broader systemic risks.  Above all, 
while the SOX imposed disclosure requirements and heightened 
expectations of public corporations’ leaders, the simultaneous risk of 
structured financial products and waning attention to risk management 
standards during the pre-crisis housing boom proved disastrous.  In other 
words, the SOX mandated more open, higher-quality “inputs” for mandated 
disclosures, aiming to enhance the required analyses conducted for effective 
regulatory oversight, but largely ignored the crucial “outputs” of those 
analyses, e.g., the assessments of CRAs and other financial institutions 
real estate markets where prices have stabilized below pre-recession peaks and further recovery 
remains unlikely, including California’s Inland Empire and speculative suburban developments 
throughout the Sunbelt broadly, as well as stagnant markets in Michigan, Ohio, and across the 
Rustbelt states).   
 100.  CROUHY, ET AL., supra note 71, at 150–52.   
 101.  Id.
 102.  Id. at 152.  
 103.  Id. at 153.  
 104.  Id. at 152. 
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which used the same disclosures to produce their own evaluations and 
strategies. 
Around the same time the SOX was passed and implemented, however, 
regulatory action by the executive branch continued the deregulatory policies 
of previous conservative administrations.  For example, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a banking regulatory body, issued new 
rules in 2003 which expanded federal preemption of state laws concerning 
regulation of national banks’ real estate lending practices.105  The effect of 
the new deregulatory rules was to displace various states’ more-stringent 
lending restrictions (prompted by Georgia’s Fair Lending Act) with less-
onerous federal standards in place at the time.106  Like the broader finance 
sector deregulatory policies over the preceding few decades, these and other 
executive actions “also contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2007” 
because
Deregulation of financial markets enabled financial institutions to 
spawn new types of mortgages that fueled the housing bubble, manufacture 
enormous volumes of securities that became toxic when the bubble 
collapsed, magnify and concentrate risk through the use of customized 
derivatives, and lever up with short-term debt.  Policies that were favored by 
the financial sector because they increased profits in the short run ended up 
making the financial system more fragile and imposing widespread losses on 
society.107
Financial sector innovation between 2002 and 2008 constituted one of 
the pitfalls facing risk managers across all areas of the economy.  The rise of 
structured finance and increasingly complex financial instruments 
accelerated during this era; while access to capital and homeownership 
opportunities expanded, however, early warnings signaled the potential for 
 105.  Preemption Determination and Order, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
(Aug. 5, 2003), 68 F.R. 46264. 
 106.  Id. Accord 12 U.S.C. § 371. 
 107.  James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 72–73 (Daniel Carpenter & David 
A. Moss eds. 2014).  Kwak is careful to note that condemnatory assessments of OCC deregulation 
and other policy failures preceding the crisis (e.g., the Federal Reserve’s punting on issues of con-
sumer protection) are too tempting with the benefits of hindsight, yet the policies implemented 
were well within standard realm of most U.S. policy debates.  That is to say, there is an expansive 
range of regulatory approaches, from a totally deregulated free-for-all to a preemption-less laby-
rinth of 50 state legal standards to which all financial institutions would need to adjust their state-
by-state policies and practices for conformity.  Assuming federal control over fair lending practice 
standards comfortably exists between those far extremes.  Id. at 73–75.  Kwak, among others, has 
referred to the interrelationships between financial regulators and the private financial sector as one 
of “cultural capture,” where social, educational, professional, and other linkages between the par-
ties can lead to suboptimal policy choices, as in the years leading to the financial crisis.  Id. at 78–
79.
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systemic risks.108  Some sector-specific warnings––e.g., the ballooning 
commercial real estate market “bubble” and its fueling by speculators’ access 
to financing––also went unheeded.109  In the short-term, whether owing to 
“irrational exuberance” among buyers and loan originators or to “risk 
aversion” among homeowners even once prices began to slide,110 the cycle 
roared well into the start of 2006.  By mid-2006, however, the American 
housing sector corrected course and began declining––by 2.6% from the 
second quarter of 2006 over the second quarter of 2005 alone.111  As early as 
October 2006, economists began predicting the “slowdown” would turn 
negative, rather than merely slowing.112  Despite concerns about the housing 
market’s inextricable links to the overall American economy,113 even 
increasingly dire projections were understated and frequently contradicted 
by competing, bullish analyses, both in the media and in academic 
publications.114  After years of record growth, the American housing market, 
having peaked in early 2006,115 would fall precipitously thereafter, leaving 
one-quarter of all U.S. mortgages underwater and erasing hundreds of 
billions in housing-invested retirement savings across the socioeconomic 
spectrum.116
 108.  See supra discussion at Parts II(B) and (C); accord Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial 
Development Made the World Riskier? (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
No. 11728, 2005). 
 109.  Catherine L. Pollina, Note, Bursting the Speculation Buying Bubble: Modifications to the 
Capital Gains Provision and the 1031 Exchange Rule, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 271, 273–77 (2007). 
 110.  Christopher Mayer, Housing Bubbles: A Survey, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 559, 561 (2011). 
 111.  Ray Barrell, Dawn Holland & Olga Pomerantz, The Housing Market and Risk of Reces-
sion in North America, 198 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 16, 17 (2006).  
 112.  Id.
 113.  As of 2006, “nearly six million payroll jobs in the US . . . [were] associated with the res-
idential housing sector,” across myriad industries.  Id.
 114.  See, e.g., James Smith, The Global Economic Environment for Turnarounds in 2006–
2007, 9 J. PRIV. EQUITY 23 (2006); accord Dawn Holland & Olga Pomerantz, Inflation Dynamics 
in North America, 199 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 15 (2007) (predicting slower–but still-positive–
growth for the U.S. into 2008, owing to a “weak housing sector”); James F. Smith, There Is No 
Housing Bubble in the USA: Housing Activity Will Remain at High Levels in 2005 and Beyond, 40 
BUS. ECON. 29, 29–30 (2005) (suggesting “many years” of continued growth, as “more and more 
households who had been renting can afford to be homeowners; or, as one observer recently put it, 
‘Any one [sic] with a brain and a decent credit rating has already bought a house’”).  
 115.  Barrell et al., supra note 111, at 18. 
 116.  See Mayer, supra note 110, at 560. 
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E.  Mechanics and Timeline of the Fall 2008 Crash and 
Aftermath 
With the benefit of hindsight, these years of gradually accumulating 
systemic risks come into focus and the calamitous consequences seemingly 
inevitable: This pressure valve released suddenly and most dramatically 
during the second half of 2008.  Increasing numbers of defaults across the 
financial industry, and especially the defaults deriving from subprime 
mortgages, began dragging the credit markets into a freeze while drying up 
already limited liquidity in capital markets.  What at first seemed like a 
normal cyclical turn toward recession escalated rapidly, signaling a fast-
approaching, historic crisis. 
Following the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008,117 the stakes of 
the looming crisis and evident recession raised further with ever-larger 
institutions approaching insolvency, most notably the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.118  The financial giant was already reported to be on “the brink of 
collapse” by early September 2008, unable to fulfill its financial obligations 
to counterparties across the financial system.119  On September 14, 2008, 
Lehman’s talks with prospective buyers––namely, Bank of America––fell 
through.120  Meanwhile, another troubled industry giant, AIG, began 
experiencing systematic difficulties with trying to sell off their toxic assets, 
such as subprime MBS and other securitized products affected by defaults 
and downward ratings migrations.121  The first major government responses 
came directly from the executive (i.e., the Federal Reserve), which gave 
$200 billion first to Fannie and Freddie,122 then “engineered JP Morgan’s 
 117.  See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.  
 118.  See supra discussion at Part II(B). 
 119.  The Crisis: A Timeline, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/news/0809/ 
gallery.week_that_broke_wall_street/index.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter The Cri-
sis: A Timeline]. http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/news/0809/gallery.week_that_broke_wa 
ll_street/index.html.  
 120.  Id.
 121.  See Sjostrom, supra note 85; accord Roger D. Congleton, On the Political Economy of 
the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008–2009, 140 PUB. CHOICE 287, 292 (2009) (discussing the 
attractiveness of “bundling” subprime mortgages, i.e., “pooling” them together to offset default 
risks and improve the lifetime cash-flows of subprime-mortgaged loans, a key incentive which 
drove riskier lending practices across the U.S. housing industry).   
 122.  Mark Calabria, David Reiss, Lawrence White, Mark Willis & Michael Levine, The Fu-
ture of Fannie and Freddie, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 339 (2014); Dwight M. Jaffee, Reining in Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac, 29 REG. 22 (2006); Dwight M. Jaffee, Reforming Fannie and Freddie,
31 REG. 52 (2008–09); Carol J. Perry, Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (2009); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: 
Fannie, Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015); see generally
FCIC REP., supra note 47, at Chap. 17.   
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purchase of Bear Stearns,” another failing investment bank whose troubles 
lingered since March 2008, including a “$29 billion guarantee” to secure the 
transaction against liquidity concerns and the uncertain scope of remaining 
toxic assets on the firms’ balance sheets.123  The Federal Reserve and a 
consortium of 10 private banks also created “a $70 billion pool of funds to 
aid troubled financial firms,” paired with “loosened . . . lending restrictions” 
from the Federal Reserve itself.124  These efforts to mitigate crisis, however, 
proved insufficient. 
The following day, September 15, 2008, stock markets began the first 
of several historic slides––a 500-point loss for the Dow Jones, among the 
steepest point losses in decades.125  AIG simultaneously faced a sudden 
credit rating downgrade from Fitch, heightening fears that the insurance 
giant’s bankruptcy was imminent, a worry which had already begun to 
spread throughout both Wall Street and Washington.126  In light of Lehman’s 
announced bankruptcy, systemic credit and liquidity freezes, and AIG’s 
instantly expected collapse and skyrocketing market volatility, the federal 
government announced, on September 16, “that it would stage a staggering 
$85 billion bailout . . . and take an 80% stake in [AIG].”127  This early, first 
major attempt at intervention failed to prevent another stock freefall on 
September 17, with the Dow sliding a further 450 points and investment 
banking giant Goldman Sachs reporting significant losses well below earlier 
forecasts, leading their share prices to drop “below $100 per share for the 
first time” in several years.128  The ensuing weeks featured extreme market 
vacillations: the Dow saw an over-400-point increase on September 18, 
followed by a then-record-breaking drop of 777 points on September 29, 
after the House of Representatives rejected the first iteration of a much 
bolder Wall Street bailout plan.129
 123.  The Crisis: A Timeline, supra note 119. 
 124.  Id.
 125.  Id.
 126.  Id.
 127.  William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Afterword to the AIG Bailout, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 
(2015).  For historical overview and empirical analysis of governmental interventions in market 
crises—e.g., bailouts, such as those granted to AIG and other financial institutions at the peak of 
the 2008 crisis, and how they compare to similar crisis responses globally—see generally Frieder-
ike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Bank Bailouts, International Linkages, and Cooperation,
5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 270 (2013); Guillermo Rosas, Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of 
Government Responses to Banking Crises, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 175 (2006).  
 128.  The Crisis: A Timeline, supra note 119. 
 129.  Cindy Perman, Dow Falls 777 as Market Reels from House Vote, CNBC (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://www.cnbc.com/id/26945972.  Despite rejecting the first bailout package, however, the fed-
eral government managed to secure several other financed responses to the building crisis.  Multi-
lateral agreements across major economies quickly emerged, including committed funding of $180 
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Concurrent volatility roiled all major international markets as 
America’s credit freeze and default losses spread globally.130  Into October 
2008, political responsiveness to the scope and severity of the crisis 
improved––especially in the United States, where credit markets remained 
frozen and whole industries outside the formal financial sector began sliding 
toward failure.  Among these troubled industries were U.S. automotive 
companies, including GM and Ford.131  Talks of a second “economic 
stimulus package” emerged from Congress in early October, with a focus on 
helping “struggling state and local governments” experiencing extreme 
pressures and waves of residential foreclosures; on October 13, details for 
the new $700 billion plan emerged, which would ultimately pass as one 
among several direct federal injections of money into the spiraling 
economy.132  By later in mid-October, just a month after Lehman’s shocking 
collapse, the macroeconomic effects of the crisis came into focus: retail sales 
figures “suffered their biggest drop in three years” over the preceding month, 
while employment rates and home values plummeted.133  Then-President of 
the San Francisco Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, remarked “that the 
economy ‘appears to be in a recession,’” the first (prescient) announcement 
from a federal government official at the onset of the global Great 
billion to bail out troubled global institutions.  Nonetheless, initial opposition to the Wall Street 
bailout largely stemmed from demurring House Democrat leadership and a bloc of House Repub-
licans; Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) argued that the bailout plan failed to “insulate Main 
Street from Wall Street,” promoting greater attention on ameliorating the mortgage foreclosure 
crisis over the short-run instead of securing major financial institutions. The 228-205 vote against 
the first bailout was a narrow but bipartisan decision: Nearly two-thirds of Republicans voted 
against the plan, compared to just one-third of Democrats.  This approach, however, quickly col-
lapsed–no cogent approach for containing the spiraling crisis emerged from those efforts, yet the 
crisis continued spiraling, with sliding stocks and the ultimate failure of another institution, Wash-
ington Mutual (“WaMu”), sparking increased panic.  At that time, WaMu’s failure was the largest 
bank failure in U.S. history.  See The Crisis: A Timeline, supra note 119. 
 130.  See, e.g., Farshad Araghi, Political Economy of the Financial Crisis: A World-Historical 
Perspective, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 30 (Nov. 8–14, 2008); Sharon Horgan, The Impact of Glob-
alisation and the Global Financial Crisis, 17 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 43 (2014); Badar Alam 
Iqbal & Farha Naz Ghauri, Impact of Global Financial Crisis on FDI Inflows, 10 J. WORLD INV.
& TRADE 463 (2009); Anush Kapadia & Arjun Jayadev, The Credit Crisis: Where It Came From, 
What Happened, and How It Might End, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 33 (Dec. 6–12, 2008); K.G. 
Viswanathan, The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on India, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 41 (2010).  
 131.  The Crisis: A Timeline, supra note 119. 
 132.  The first—the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)—was a $200-billion bailout 
package for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, passed in late 2008; the second, formally called the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”), provided a $787-billion direct “economic 
stimulus plan that provided tax relief to both small businesses and individuals, and expanded un-
employment and welfare benefits” to blunt the sharpest effects of the crisis, Grinshteyn, supra note 
78, at 938.  
 133.  The Crisis: A Timeline, supra note 119.  
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Recession.134  Altogether, the effects on domestic household wealth were 
grave, lingering well into the still-ongoing economic recovery.135
IV.  Toward a Post-Recession Understanding of CRAS as 
Potential Facilitators of Systemic Risk 
A.  Framing Judicial Responses to the Crisis and to the CRAs: 
State and Federal Courts Diverge on CRA Liability 
Given the unprecedented nature of the financial crisis and its expansive 
effects on housing markets and employment, casual observers might have 
expected forceful rebukes of financial sector actors’ behavior during the 
preceding economic cycle.  However, the administrative and legal-
regulatory constraints upon major executive agencies, such as the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve, left insiders and legal academics with 
lesser expectations.136  In the signal state and federal court cases which 
unfolded after the crisis, litigation outcomes diverged sharply across the 
voluminous published opinions.137  The following section reviews several 
such landmark cases and concludes that, despite inconsistencies, courts have 
demonstrated an overall greater willingness to extend liability to financial 
sector actors, including CRAs, all the while disregarding or challenging the 
salience of First Amendment-grounded defenses. 
 134.  The Crisis: A Timeline, supra note 119. See also, Grinshteyn, supra note 78, at 937–39 
(noting the collapse of “three of the largest Wall Street investment banks [over] six months” in 
2008, as well as a nearly-20% drop in average home prices across 20 “major [U.S.] cities by the 
end of November 2008” and over 2% increase in unemployment year-over-year).   
 135.  Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 
J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2009); Robert Madsen & Richard Katz, Comparing Crises: Is the Current 
Economic Collapse Like Japan’s in the 1990s? 88 FOREIGN AFF. 159 (2009) (discussing total loss 
estimates, which could include as much as $15 trillion in lost U.S. household wealth, and contex-
tualizing those losses as compared to the late 1980s/early 1990s collapse of Japanese economic 
growth); Lee E. Ohanian, The Economic Crisis from a Neoclassical Perspective, 24 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 45 (2010); accord CROUHY ET AL., supra note 71 passim.
 136.  Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON.
ACTIVITY 1, 3 (Spring 2009) (“Given these [sorts of] constraints, some steps that are attractive in 
principle turn out to be impractical in reality . . . A lesson for academics is that any time they use 
the verb ‘force’ . . . the next sentence should set for the section of the U.S. legal code that allows 
that course of action.”); accord Mishkin, supra note 98, at 52–53 (responding to critiques of the 
U.S. government’s decision to allow Lehman Brothers to enter bankruptcy, noting that regulatory 
authorities were unclear of the scope of their authority to do so and were especially “extended” 
following their controversial decision to protect Bear Stearns through a “government safety net” 
earlier in 2008).  
 137.  See generally Michael D. Greenberg & Geoffrey McGovern, Patterns of Civil Litigation
13–14, in RAND Corp., An Early Assessment of the Civil Justice System After the Financial Crisis: 
Something Wicked This Way Comes? 13–14 (RAND Corp., OP-353-ICJ, (2012), https://www.r 
and.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP353.html.   
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B.  Extending Liability to Financial Sector Actors Generally
One of the first controversial cases involving extension of liability 
following the financial crisis was In re Del Monte in 2011.138  In Del Monte,
the Delaware Chancery Court enjoined the titular food company from 
permitting a shareholder vote on a proposed merger with Blue Acquisition 
Group, a consortium of three private equity firms: Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts 
& Co. (KKR), Centerview Partners, and Vestar Capital Partners.139  The 
entire process of negotiating and effectuating the merger transaction was 
marred by problems.  First, the Del Monte board failed in “allowing KKR to 
team up with Vestar, the higher bidder in a previous solicitation of 
interest.”140  The Chancery Court viewed this as a potential violation of the 
Del Monte board’s fiduciary duties––i.e., they failed to pursue Vestar’s 
original, better per-share deal to the detriment of their shareholders by 
cutting off their opportunities to explore and to allow a vote on a superior 
offer.  Second––and more seriously––the Del Monte board erred in 
“authorizing Barclays Capital, the financial advisor to Del Monte [on the 
sell-side of the transaction], to [also] provide buy-side financing to KKR.”141
This latter choice ultimately gave Barclays a higher profit than it would have 
had otherwise, but also imposed a superfluous $3-million cost on Del Monte 
for obtaining “a last-minute fairness opinion” from another bank.142
The roles of Barclays on both sides of the deal proved a central, 
controversial focus in the case, leading the Chancery Court to enjoin the 
consummation of the deal for 20 days, including withholding the $120-
million termination fee which “KKR otherwise would receive in the event of 
a topping bid,” to allow the Del Monte board to evaluate alternatives and 
perform the due diligence search for the best possible transaction.143 Del
Monte also proved a dramatic turn for Delaware’s approach toward judicial 
review of corporate misconduct.  The Chancery Court refused to apply the 
traditional business judgment rule to the various defendants’ actions, opting 
for the stricter “enhanced scrutiny” approach.144  More profoundly, the 
shareholders’ claims for Barclays’ “aiding and abetting fiduciary breach” 
were allowed to proceed, meaning the investment bank could face liability 
 138.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).  
 139.  Id. at 817.  
 140.  Id.
 141.  Id.
 142.  Id. at 818.  
 143.  Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d at 844–45. 
 144.  Id. at 830.  
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for knowing participation in a scheme which ignored shareholders’ best 
interests.  As the Chancery Court summarized: 
But for Barclays’ manipulations, the Del Monte process would 
have played out differently.  If the directors had known at the 
outset of Barclays’ intentions and activities, the Board likely 
would have hired a different banker . . . Even if the directors 
decided to proceed with Barclays, the Board and its experienced 
counsel doubtless would have taken steps to protect the integrity 
of the process . . . [Had] Barclays disclosed its buy-side 
aspirations, the Board likely would have . . . ‘nixed the idea.’  The 
Board and its counsel likely also would have limited the role of 
Barclays lending group, chaperoned its discussions with bidders, 
or used another bank to provide confidential feedback to the 
potential sponsors about leverage parameters and market 
expectations.
Although [these] activities and non-disclosures in early 2010 are 
troubling, what indisputably crossed the line was [Barclays’] 
surreptitious and unauthorized pairing of Vestar with KKR.  In 
doing so, Barclays materially reduced the prospect of price 
competition [through outside bids] for Del Monte . . . Most 
egregiously, Barclays actively concealed [this] pairing from the 
Del Monte Board.145
While a single case does not signal a definitive reversal from 
Delaware’s often pejoratively labeled “race to the bottom” in corporate 
manager-friendly rulings,146 Del Monte nonetheless suggests a greater 
willingness to extend a court’s equitable powers—and a concomitant 
openness to extending liability to new classes of defendants—in particularly 
“egregious” cases.147  M&A financial advisors and financiers long have been 
criticized for participating in transactions despite their own “conflicts” on 
 145.  Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d at 833–34.  
 146.  John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 
1345, 1349 (2012).  
 147.  See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2014); Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points 
of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623 (2017); John W. 
Noble, Fixing Lawyers’ Mistakes: The Court’s Role in Administering Delaware’s Corporate Stat-
ute, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 293 (2016); Jason Rigby, Financial Advisor Aiding and Abetting of a 
Breach of a Fiduciary Duty Post Rural Metro: Clarifying “Knowing Participation,” 41 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 545 (2017).  
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both sides of a potential deal.148  While recent Delaware cases provide 
“mixed messages” on these and other questions of third-party liability for 
misconduct in business activities,149 analogizing investment bank or private 
equity firms’ actions to CRAs and the inherent conflicts of their “issuer-
pays” model of ratings.150  As with Barclays in Del Monte, CRAs’ ex ante
advising of security issuers and the structuring of their financial products, 
combined with their subsequent ratings of those same instruments, similarly 
provides possible bases for extending liability in novel ways.  The following 
sections elaborate a series of additional recent federal court cases focusing 
on the CRAs directly, suggesting a similarly mixed record of outcomes and 
an uncertain doctrinal evolution ripe for higher court review. 
C.  Key Federal Cases Following the Crash 
1.  Abu Dhabi v. Morgan Stanley
Another seminal case, Abu Dhabi v. Morgan Stanley,151 is a companion 
to an earlier, pre-crisis case where CRAs’ “actual knowledge of [a] 
corporation’s fraud” had material “fact issues remaining,” leading the court 
to deny in part the CRAs’ motion to dismiss claims.152 Abu Dhabi is integral 
to advancing this understanding of CRA liability, scienter requirements for 
fraud and related derivative claims, and the pleading requirements to survive 
a motion to dismiss for such cases.  Plaintiffs—comprised of various 
structured investment vehicle (SIV) institutional investors—sued Morgan 
Stanley, S&P, Moody’s and other financial industry defendants for 
numerous claims related to fraud and negligent misrepresentation in the sale 
of investments through the SIV.153  The SIV, called “Cheyne,” had received 
ratings of at least A- across all its tranches, and its medium-term notes were 
 148.  Andrew Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1080, 1081 
(2016).
 149.  Tuch, supra note 148, at 1082.  
 150.  See supra discussion at Part III(B), passim.
 151.  Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012).
 152.  In re Nat’l Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 656 (S.D. Ohio 
2008) (denying Moody’s motion to dismiss claims by Lloyds Bank as to negligent misrepresenta-
tion and Ohio State “blue sky law” claims); but see Ohio State & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & 
Poor’s Financial Services LLC, 700 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing National Century and 
granting a motion to dismiss all three major CRAs on myriad grounds).  See generally Bailey, supra 
note 26; John Crawford, Hitting the Sweet Spot by Accident: How Recent Lower Court Cases Help 
Realign Incentives in the Credit Rating Industry, 42 CONN. L. REV. CONTEMPLATIONS 13 (2009); 
Timothy M. Sullivan, Note, Federal Preemption and the Ratings Agencies: Eliminating State Law 
Liability to Promote Quality Ratings, 94 MINN. L. REV. 2136 (2010). 
 153.  Abu Dhabi Com. Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 439.  
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rated as highly as AAA, in the run-up to the financial crisis.154  As the credit 
and financial crises unfolded, however, these strong ratings plunged; 
ultimately, Cheyne’s assets had to be sold in July 2008, with a winning 
auction bid providing only “43.9% of notional value.”155  Although the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed most claims 
against the defendants at summary judgment, the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss claims that they had aided and abetted fraud was denied.156
Remarkably, and distinctly unlike most cases of this nature, the District 
Court’s reasons for denying the CRA-defendants’ motion focused on the 
ratings issued by the CRAs.157  The plaintiffs originally had argued the 
ratings in question were “attributable to Morgan Stanley,” a framing they 
apparently viewed as necessary to satisfy the fraud claim elements.158  The 
district court rejected this view on attributing blame, finding that Morgan 
Stanley could only be held liable, in any event, for aiding and abetting fraud 
under New York law–but the court further found the CRAs could be held 
liable for fraud themselves because the ratings themselves constituted the 
“fraudulent misrepresentation” upon which the plaintiffs relied.159  Hence, 
the court reasoned, the ratings in question were attributable to the CRAs, not 
to the investment banks.160
Crucially, the fact-or-opinion nature of credit ratings was addressed 
squarely by the court as well.  Under New York law, the court held, CRAs’ 
ratings are “a hybrid” of both “pure statements of either fact or opinion.”161
Thus, such “ratings are actionable because they are understood to be 
statements of creditworthiness based on an analysis of underlying facts 
conducted by respected ratings organizations.”162  While fact issues 
remained—i.e., whether the CRAs “knowingly issue[d] a rating . . . 
unsupported by reasoned analysis or without a factual foundation,” a 
 154.  Id. at 441; see also Settlement Cost for Moody’s, S&P, Morgan Stanley is $225 million: 
WSJ, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moodys-sp-settlement-wsj/set-
tlement-cost-for-moodys-sp-morgan-stanley-is-225-million-wsj-idUSBRE93S11920130429 (dis-
cussing the highly-rated SIVs, noting “much of [their] underlying collateral was low-quality or 
subprime mortgage debt,” and reporting the ultimate settlement between the parties involved).  
 155.  Abu Dhabi Com. Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 474.  
 156.  Id. at 439.  
 157.  Id. at 450–51.  
 158.  Id. at 449.  
 159.  Id. at 450–52.  
 160.  Abu Dhabi Com. Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 450–52.
 161.  Id. at 454 (emphasis added).  
 162.  Id.
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required element for the plaintiffs’ fraud claims163—the court denied 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.164  Ultimately, the parties settled 
for $225 million in April 2013.165
2. Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch and Co.
Among the seminal post-crisis cases regarding CRA liability are a pair 
of decisions cursorily dismissing claims, consistent with and epitomizing a 
more-permissive approach toward CRAs and their activities.  In the first 
case, Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch and Co., the District Court for the 
Northern District of California ruled that Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations precluded judicial review of CRA 
“opinions.”166  After removing the case to New York’s Southern District, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the original findings and disposition of the Northern 
District of California on appeal.167  The Second Circuit further held that 
broker-dealers—such as investment banks, private wealth management 
funds, and others who facilitate securities transactions for clients168—remain 
subject to a “suitability” standard, meaning their recommendations regarding 
securities transactions need only show a “reasonable basis” escape liability, 
rather than the more-rigorous standards found in fiduciary duty-based forms 
of liability.169  Furthermore, the court ruled that broker-dealers do not have 
any “duty to monitor [a client] account or provide advice between 
transactions,” affirming earlier cases’ rulings on point.170
Across these cases, several district courts and the Second Circuit 
generally followed a restrained approach to judicial review of financial 
sector actors’ liability in these contexts.  The first few years after the crisis 
and ensuing recession thus suggested continued preclusion of CRA liability, 
 163.  Abu Dhabi Com. Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 455–56 (discussing as well the proof require-
ments post-summary judgment, e.g., that the CRAs knowingly issued misleading ratings which 
constituted a statement of “fact-based opinion that [the CRAs did] not believe to be true,” and that 
this “disbelief” existed at the moment the ratings were issued).  
 164.  Id. at 458.  
 165.  Settlement Cost for Moody’s, S&P, Morgan Stanley is $225 million, supra note 154.  
 166.  785 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 167.  Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 168.  Andrew Melnick, What’s in a Name: The Battle over a Uniform Fiduciary Standard for 
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 415, 421 (2013). 
 169.  Id. at 422–24 (citing Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Regulatory Notice 11-25: 
Know Your Customer and Suitability (May 2011), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/No-
ticeDocument/p123701.pdf; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority); FINRA Rule 2111, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2018). 
 170.  Id. at 425; see also In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 375 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002).  
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 148 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 148 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
CARR_MACROED FINAL 10.4.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2018 6:27 PM
280 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
with consistent rulings issued even in ostensibly extreme cases.  In Ohio
Police & Fire Pension Fund, for example, the District Court for the Southern 
District Court of Ohio held Standard & Poor’s could not be held liable under 
Ohio’s Securities Act and that CRAs do not owe a duty to investors upon 
which a claim for negligent misrepresentation can be made.171  Similarly, in 
New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York held CRAs are not subject to liability for their ratings, 
although underwriters and originators may be liable for material 
misstatements made in the process of obtaining ratings or when misleadingly 
using ratings in their own investment materials.172  Finally, New York’s 
Southern District also denied a motion for class certification by plaintiffs, 
whose claims against Moody’s, alleging fraud and material 
misrepresentation, were based in analogous rationales.173
These post-crisis cases, like others which did not find liability for 
CRAs, often turn on SEC regulatory language, standing and class 
certification issues, and the materiality element of state fraud claims.  On 
first impression, they suggest CRAs might be spared from liability for their 
involvements in the underlying mechanisms driving the financial and 
economic meltdown.  However, unlike Abu Dhabi and the following case, 
Genesee County, the abovementioned courts neither reached nor ruled on 
matters concerning what a CRA’s ratings are–i.e., whether they constitute 
speech and, if so, which particular level of protection their speech should 
receive under extant constitutional frameworks.  Where courts have done so, 
and especially where state laws have been held to permit CRA liability more 
generally, the CRAs have fared far less favorably.  
3.  Genesee County v. Thornburg
The background and parties involved in Genesee County largely echo 
Abu Dhabi,174 and the outcome was likewise similar, with several of the 
Genesee plaintiffs’ claims against the CRAs surviving motions to dismiss.175
In brief, the “[lawsuit] arose from significant losses on MBS-based 
investments; class-certified plaintiffs [various public employee retirement 
funds] alleged misrepresentations by defendants regarding investments 
 171.  Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Financial Servs., LLC, 813 F. 
Supp. 2d 871 (S.D. Ohio 2011). 
 172.  New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC, 720 F. 
Supp. 2d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 173.  In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 274 F.R.D. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 174.  See supra discussion in Part IV(A)(2).  
 175.  Genesee Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Tr. 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1082 
(D.N.M 2011).  
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which “misled the asserted class as to the true risk of these investments.”176
While reviewing the factual record, the District Court of New Mexico 
described the “misrepresentations” in detail, focusing on Wells Fargo’s 
“systematic failure to follow its stated underwriting standards,” minimum 
underwriting thresholds which were intended to be enforced regardless of 
borrowers’ credit and borrowing capacities, disregard for falsified loan 
application contents and, across all defendants, a general “failure . . . to 
employ the stated underwriting standards.”177  In addition, Thornburg––the 
investment vehicle through which the Wells Fargo-underwritten loans were 
generated, securitized, and sold–had generated the underlying instruments in 
a manner that “misrepresented the truth . . . in violation of [Thornburg’s 
own] underwriting standards, failing to include . . . sufficient documentation 
concerning the borrowers’ financial circumstances,” among other failures.178
These actions produced systematically “inflated appraisals” by all named 
defendants, enough to suggest a plausible, comprehensive, knowing scheme 
perpetrated by the financial institutions involved.179  Wells Fargo, in 
particular, “systematically threaten[ed] to not do business with real estate 
appraisers [who] failed to manipulate their appraisals above market 
value.”180
Regarding the CRA-defendants, the court found the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings regarding Moody’s and Fitch were insufficient, but also ruled that 
claims against S&P could proceed.181  In so finding, the court emphatically 
stated that “The First Amendment does not bar the Plaintiffs’ claims against 
the [CRAs]”182, distinguishing the earlier precedent set by Greenmoss
Builders183 and far more directly addressing the constitutional issue than in 
Abu Dhabi.  The court in Genesee County explained that the ratings at hand 
were not “published [for] the public at large,” but rather served as tailored, 
targeted pieces of information provided to a broad range of institutional 
investors in their initial offering documents, however “small” these investors 
 176.  Genesee Cty., 825 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99.  
 177.  Id. at 1104.  
 178.  Id. at 1105.  
 179.  Id. at 1105–06.  
 180.  Id.
 181.  Genesee Cty., 825 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. 
 182.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 183.  Id. at 1236 (“The credit ratings at issue . . . are not entitled to First Amendment 
protection”); see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761(1985) 
(asserting expression not addressing “a matter of public concern”–unlike the claim in Greenmoss–
is not entitled to the same level of First Amendment protection as general public pronouncements, 
irrespective of the “type” of speech in question). 
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were in numbers.184  Regardless, where ratings contain “speech” which is 
“wholly false and clearly damaging to the [victim],” under commercial 
speech doctrine the speech is accorded even-lower protections, if any.185
Here, the court concluded “false opinions,” like S&P’s ratings for 
Thornburg’s securities, were entitled no First Amendment protections 
whatsoever––stopping only just short of calling them “lies” outright, while 
suggesting as much.186  Following Thornburg’s bankruptcy and dissolution 
in mid-2009,187 a series of settlements followed, ending the related 
litigation.188
V.  CRAS and Post-2016 Financial Sector Regulation 
A.  The Incomplete Post-Crisis Reforms and a Return to 
Deregulation in the U.S. 
Key state and federal courts have scrutinized financial sector actors 
more closely since the crisis and Great Recession,189 with diverging case 
outcomes set to establish or sharpen an emerging circuit split; meanwhile, 
the U.S. Congress has begun moving in the opposite direction.  For example, 
a White House-backed deregulatory bill passed a threshold vote to enter 
Senate debate in early March 2018.190  If passed, the bill would roll back 
 184.  Genesee Cty., 825 F. Supp. 2d at 136–37.  
 185.  Id. at 1237–38 (citing Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 762). 
 186.  Id. at 1238; for discussions of unprotected “lies” under the First Amendment, see gener-
ally Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1435 (2015); cf. Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161 
(2012); Ilya Shapiro, Trevor Burris & Gabriel Latner, Truthiness and the First Amendment, 16 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 51 (2013); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amend-
ment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010); Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Prob-
lem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445 (2012).   
 187.  THORNBURG MORTGAGE ANNOUNCEMENT, TMST (2009), http://thornburgmortgage. com.  
 188.  See, e.g., Justin T. Hilley, Thornburg Mortgage Settles with Investors, Awaits Court Ap-
proval, HOUS. WIRE (June 1, 2012), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/thornburg-mortgage-
settles-investors-awaits-court-approval; Patrick Fitzgerald, Barclays to Pay $23 Million to Settle 
Thornburg Mortgage Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bar-
clays-to-pay-23-million-to-settle-thornburg-mortgage-lawsuit-1408559969.  
 189.  See supra discussion in Part IV.  
 190.  Renae Merle, Senate Sponsor of Bank Deregulation Bill Offers Changes in Hopes of At-
tracting House Support, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/busi-
ness/wp/2018/03/08/senate-sponsor-of-bank-deregulation-bill-offers-changes-in-hopes-of-attract-
ing-house-support/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6dc45c6f85d0; Jim Puzzanghera, Lawmakers 
Revise Financial Deregulation Bill to Try to Blunt Criticisms and Assure House Passage, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-dodd-frank-regulations-20180308-
story.html; Zachary Warmbrodt, Senate Advances Bank Deregulation Bill as Democrats Break 
Ranks, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/06/elizabeth-warren-
bank-deregulation-bank-bill-387979.
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regulatory requirements, including the Dodd-Frank Act’s stress-testing 
requirements for large lending institutions, key defendants from the 
following cases prominently among them.  The rejection of Dodd-Frank’s 
“too big to fail” provisions may heighten the likelihood of myriad legal 
challenges, not diminish them, since the reform-targeting provisions do not 
clearly touch upon the actions prompting findings of CRA liability.191
Under existing regulations, beginning with 12 C.F.R. § 46.1(b), national 
banks must perform stress tests at least annually in compliance with 
requirements under 12 C.F.R § 46.2 et seq.192  Subsequent sections of the 
regulation include requirements which vary depending upon a covered 
bank’s size.193  A bank’s board of directors, however, retains the same duties 
regardless of its covered institution’s size.194  The Dodd-Frank Annual Stress 
Test, or “DFAST” requirements, are set out under 12 C.F.R. § 46.5 and 
successive sub-sections.  The minimum requirements thereunder are set by 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); these requirements 
include the time horizons of financial data to be used in the institution’s 
models and reports;195 requirement that the institution’s stress tests include 
three “conditions” sets, i.e., baseline, adverse, and severely adverse 
 191.  Notably, Dodd-Frank presents a compromise, “middle ground” policy reform drawn in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis; among the options considered by the federal government and 
in popular media debates at the time, some advocated for a total “government-led reconstruction of 
the financial marketplace,” breaking up larger banks so none could ever become “too big to fail” 
again while imposing much stricter financing and risk-mitigation practices, while others champi-
oned a return to minimal governmental intrusion after markets had stabilized, allowing the surviv-
ing corporations to sift through the rebuilding process unimpeded.  Nolan McCarty, Complexity, 
Capacity, and Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE 
AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 99, 99–100 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds. 2014).  
 192.  12 C.F.R. §§ 46.1–46.2 (2012, 2018).  
 193.  12 C.F.R. § 46.3(a) (2018) (requiring a bank’s size be determined by the averaged value 
of its total assets over the four prior quarters). 
 194.  See 12 C.F.R. § 46.6. (2015).  Specifically, banks are subdivided according to the general 
value of assets they hold, e.g., banks with under $10-billion in assets, banks with between $10 and 
$50 billion in assets, and those with over $50-billion in assets.  12 C.F.R. § 46.3(b)(1), (2) (2018).  
The regulatory text further specifies that banks can move between these categories in either direc-
tion; when banks move from the $10 billion range to the $50-billion-plus range, they immediately 
trigger the stress test requirements for those institutions.  12 C.F.R. § 46.3(d)(2) (2018). In addition, 
subsidiaries or other banking institutions controlled by a holding company may elect to subject 
themselves to the requirements for the larger institution, i.e., if their holding company is a covered 
“$50 billion institution,” they may opt for those requirements.  12 C.F.R. § 46.3(e)(1), (2) (2018).  
Note, however, that the OCC may in its discretion require non-covered institutions to comply with 
these regulations—including stress testing requirements, their timing, scope, reporting, etc.—at any 
time.  12 C.F.R. § 46.4(a) (2014). 
 195.  For all stress tests by covered institutions after January 2016, calendar-year data running 
through the previous December 31 are to be used.  12 C.F.R. § 46.5(a) (2018). 
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economic scenarios;196 inclusion of trading activities, e.g., to cover 
counterparty and trading risks, when requested by the OCC;197 and the results 
of stress tests must be incorporated into the business decisions of the board 
and senior management as appropriate.198
Under 12 C.F.R. § 46.6, a covered institution’s board must adhere to 
the foregoing requirements while also (a) ensuring adequate controls and 
review over the process, (b) guaranteeing sufficient documentation of 
procedures used, (c) reviewing and approving all procedures at least 
annually, and (d) reviewing stress test results at least annually.199  While 
subject to widespread academic debate and critique,200 especially regarding 
the increased complexity and difficulty of regulatory compliance for the 
largest U.S. banks,201 amending or removing the DFAST regulatory 
requirements alone would not offer clear implications for the CRAs and their 
actions as non-covered institutions.  Recent judicial responses to the CRAs’ 
activities, however, provide a clearer picture of heightened post-recession 
liability risks, irrespective of recent legislative proposals. 
B.  Post-2018 and Expected Shifts Toward Conservatism on 
Federal Courts 
Time alone gives definition.  Nevertheless . . . professional 
commentators with grave authority make analyses which the briefest 
interval often declares invalid. 
 –Gore Vidal202
Speculation about future events, political and economic ones especially, 
invites trouble.  This final section of the analysis thus avoids prediction-
 196.  That is, these scenarios should cover routine economic and financial conditions, 
“stressed” conditions, and extreme economic and financial downturns (deep recessions), corre-
sponding to the three named scenarios; precise descriptions for each of these scenarios are provided 
by the OCC to covered institutions in mid-February of each year.  12 C.F.R. § 46.5(b) (2018).   
 197.  As with the three “conditions” scenarios, the OCC provides information and requirements 
by March 1 of each year.  12 C.F.R. § 46.5(c) (2018).  
 198.  These decisions include capital planning, capital adequacy, and general risk management 
approaches, among others.  12 C.F.R. § 46.5(d) (2018). 
 199.  12 C.F.R. § 46.6(c)(1), (2) (2015). 
 200.  See, e.g., Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein, & Adi Sunderam, 
Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 479 (Fall 2017).  
 201.  Stephen Gandel, Why the Bank Stress Tests Don’t Really Matter, FORTUNE (July 2, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/07/02/fed-bank-stress-tests/.
 202.  Gore Vidal, Novelists and Critics of the 1940s, in UNITED STATES: ESSAYS 1952–1992
10, 10 (1993).  While Vidal was speaking of commentaries from within literary academia, his cau-
tions are universal. 
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making, instead offering an overview of recent secondary analyses and 
current affairs.  In doing so, the aim is to provide a range of possible 
trajectories in the near-future, a limited set of informed hypotheses about 
likely federal court disposition of cases involving CRAs and their First 
Amendment claims, and a general framework for further studies. 
Recent scholarship focused on CRAs have affirmed the complicated 
roles of CRAs in global financial systems–as information “intermediaries,” 
as standard-setters for investment grade instruments under agency-
promulgated regulations and state law analogues, among other functions.203
A more nuanced finding from a series of studies shows, however, that CRAs’ 
ratings “did . . . contain important information predicting future downgrades 
and defaults” not otherwise “reflected in the credit rating” of an MBS, as 
well as that the ratings “did not reflect all available (negative) information 
concerning” default risks, in the CRAs’ own admissions and in private 
investor behaviors before the crash.204  While these findings suggest 
criticisms of CRAs’ roles in understating the riskiness of investments might 
be amplifying their systemic consequences unfairly–if private investors 
understood the limits of ratings and the riskiness of their investing choices 
from outside information, then the CRAs ought not shoulder 
disproportionate blame–reliance on ratings for specific types of instruments 
appears to have been widespread.  In particular, AAA-rated MBS tranches, 
including many which ultimately downgraded, becoming toxic and 
functionally valueless, seemed to be relied upon in the market leading into 
the crisis.  Where such MBSs were so highly rated, passive investors—those 
least likely to undertake the nuanced, individual analyses required to 
ascertain otherwise hidden “negative information”––flocked, despite 
underlying, systemic risks far in excess of what the “AAA” ratings 
suggested.205
These and related findings are troubling for a highly concentrated, 
relatively uncompetitive market: today, “approximately 96% of all ratings 
are provided by just three CRAs,” the aforementioned Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch, an even higher percentage of the total ratings market than before the 
 203.  Allen Ferrell & John Morley, New Special Study of the Securities Markets: Institutional 
Intermediaries 38–39 (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 580), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=3005542.
 204.  Id. at 39–40.  Accord Manuel Adelino, How Much Do Investors Rely on Ratings? The 
Case of Mortgage Backed Securities (June 22, 2009), unpublished dissertation, https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1425216; Adam Ashcraft, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & James Vickery, MBS Ratings and the 
Mortgage Credit Boom (Fed. Reserve Bank N.Y., Staff Report No. 449), https://www.newyork-
fed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr449.pdf. 
 205.  Ferrell & Morley, supra note 203, at 40.  
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crisis.206  Simultaneously, the same leading firms experienced dramatic 
growth over the last two decades which continues: Moody’s profits tripled 
between 2002 and 2006 alone;207 more-recently, S&P’s revenues increased 
by 14% year-over-year, from Q4 2016 to Q4 2017,208 and a further 7% 
increase for Q2 2018,209 in keeping with previous years’ growth; Fitch, a 
subsidiary of Hearst Corporation and the smallest of the three leading CRAs, 
“recorded record revenue and profit” which contributed to Hearst’s seventh-
consecutive year of overall growth during 2017.210  Consolidation and an 
anti-competitive industry altogether remain unchanged.  The implications of 
relatively lacking competition are expansive, with recent commentaries and 
analyses suggesting both opportunities for and improved ratings accuracy 
outcomes by enhancing the number and variety of firms in the ratings 
sector.211
The foregoing is a decidedly truncated review of recent work on post-
crisis legal and economic policies.  Others have called for, inter alia, a more-
flexible legal framework which responds to the disparate behaviors of 
economic fundamentals during “normal” conditions as compared to during 
“deep recessions”;212 greater exploration of how corporate law, specifically, 
ought to adjust to financial and economic crises;213 and further understanding 
of how legal and regulatory changes may “prompt the spread of ‘investor-
driven financial innovations,’” i.e., how markets respond to governmental 
 206.  Ferrell & Morley, supra note 203, at 42.  
 207.  Id.
 208.  S&P Global Reports 4th Quarter and Full-Year 2017 Results, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sp-global-reports-4th-quarter-and-full-year-
2017-results-300594101.html.  
 209.  S&P Global Reports Second Quarter Results, S&P GLOBAL INVESTOR RELATIONS (July 
26, 2018), http://investor.spglobal.com/file/Index?KeyFile=394368238.  
 210.  Hearst President & CEO Steven R. Schwartz Letter to Employees on Hearst’s 2017 Per-
formance, HEARST CORP. (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.hearst.com/newsroom/hearst-president-ceo-
steven-swartz-letter-to-employees-on-hearst-s-2017-performance; accord Sami Main, Hearst 
Scored Record Profits for the 7th Consecutive Year, According to Memo From CEO, ADWEEK (Jan. 
2, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/tv-video/hearst-scored-record-profits-for-the-7th-consecutive-
year-according-to-memo-from-ceo/.
 211.  Ferrell & Morley, supra note 203 at 42; accord Francesco Sangiorgi & Chester Spatt, The 
Economics of Credit Rating Agencies, 12 FOUNDS. & TRENDS FIN. 1 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1561/0500000048.  
 212.  See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions
(Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 576), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2828352.
 213.  See Yair Listokin & Inho Andrew Mun, Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial 
Crisis, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3105175.
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actions, and do so with potentially systemic consequences.214  As these and 
many other works build upon lessons from the last decade, ambiguous global 
and domestic economic factors may presage upcoming challenges.  In the 
U.S., exceptionally low unemployment after nearly a decade of sustained yet 
sluggish recovery is promising,215 but incomes are largely flat216 and housing 
markets appear to be slowing dramatically, especially in the largest, most 
competitive metropolitan markets, like Seattle, the Bay Area, and Austin, 
Texas.217  While credit-based buying across all sectors remains far below the 
spiraling pre-crisis trends and recent home-starts by developers have slowed 
in lockstep with home buying habits–suggesting present trends are more a 
“cooling” of housing markets than a prelude to a disastrous “bust” as in 
2007218––another recession, as always, will come eventually.  Uncertainty in 
global markets from Brexit, unresolved trade disputes among leading global 
economic powers,219 ongoing and mass-scale global corporate 
consolidations, high-profile corporate misconduct, and government 
corruption scandals220––all will have indeterminate effects on the severity 
and timing of the next downturn, as well as the U.S. government’s responses. 
 214.  See Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation (Columbia Law and Econom-
ics Working Paper No. 576), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068991.
 215.  Natalie Kitroeff, Unemployment Rate Hits 3.9%, a Rare Low, as Job Market Becomes 
More Competitive, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/business/e 
conomy/jobs-report.html.  
 216.  Tim Duy, Companies Can’t Hold the Line on U.S. Wages Much Longer, BLOOMBERG
(May 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-16/wages-are-poised-to-in-
crease-at-a-faster-rate (reporting that, while unemployment dropped to 3.9 % in the April 2018 jobs 
report, wage growth was only 2.6 % over the previous year–and only 0.6 % when accounting for 
estimated inflation rates).  
 217.  Prashant Gopal & Sho Chandra, The U.S. Housing Market Looks Headed for Its Worst 
Slowdown in Years, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2 
018-07-26/american-housing-market-is-showing-signs-of-running-out-of-steam.  
 218.  Id.
 219.  See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia, In Abrupt Shift, Trump Makes Nice with EU, Gets Tough on 
Russia, POLITICO (July 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/25/trump-russia-euro-
pean-union-juncker-742718.  
 220.  See, e.g., the ongoing “1MDB” scandal in Malaysia, involving various allegations of 
fraud, money laundering, and embezzlement of development project funds by Malaysia’s state de-
velopment giant, 1Malaysia Development Bhd., which has ensnared U.S. hedge fund giant Gold-
man Sachs in legal inquiries.  Andrea Tan, Singapore Police Examine Goldman’s Role in 1MDB 
Deals, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-03/singa-
pore-police-are-said-to-examine-goldman-role-in-1mdb-deals; Former Goldman Sachs Banker in 
1MDB Plea Talks with U.S.: WSJ, REUTERS (July 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
malaysia-scandal-goldman-sachs/former-goldman-sachs-banker-in-1mdb-plea-talks-with-u-s-wsj-
idUSKBN1K007K.  As of March 2018, an estimated $4.8 billion out of the total $6.5 billion Gold-
man Sachs helped 1MDB raise from 2012 through 2013 had been “diverted” from the company 
into various personal and shell company bank accounts, including a one-time, $681-million transfer 
to former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s personal account, as well as extensive purchases 
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Outside academic discourses and economic trend lines, ongoing 
political happenings in the U.S. and around the world may influence both 
regulatory approaches to the CRAs and federal courts’ dispositions of CRA-
related litigation outcomes as well.  The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch 
and the pending appointment of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s replacement on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, likely will cement a nascent period of 
conservative dominance over the Court in coming years.221  Below the 
Supreme Court, too, the record-setting pace of federal appeals judge 
appointments in 2017222 suggests overall tilt toward conservatism in the 
federal judicial system–and, thus, a more-favorable environment for review 
of potential challenges to deregulatory policies from the executive and 
legislative branches. 
At the same time, jurisprudence on First Amendment matters—from 
CRAs’ claims to heightened protections of their ratings opinions 
thereunder—further complicates any effort to forecast specific outcomes.  
Justice Kennedy and his fellow Republican Party appointees on the U.S. 
Supreme Court certainly held and ruled upon expansive views of First 
Amendment protections in recent decades.223  In other areas, however, the 
ideological binary of the Court breaks down regularly–and most 
interestingly, when contemplating litigation against CRA-defendants.  At 
least some liberal justices, for instance, have sided with conservative 
counterparts on particularity requirements for pleadings under antitrust 
of “luxury items such as a yacht, a Picasso painting, and [jewelry].”  Jamie Smyth & Don Weinland, 
Australia PM’s Son Says Goldman Sidelined Him After 1MDB Warnings, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/cb0fbf5c-2284-11e8-9a70-08f715791301.  
 221.  See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, Trump’s Supreme Court Appointee Gorsuch Plots Rightward 
Course, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-gorsuch/trumps-
supreme-court-appointee-gorsuch-plots-rightward-course-idUSKBN1EE0IJ.  
 222.  Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many Federal Appeals 
Judges as Obama in His First Year, TIME (Dec. 17, 2017), http://time.com/5066679/donald-tr 
ump-federal-judges-record/.; Deanna Paul, Trump Promised to Remake the Courts. He’s Installing 
Conservative Judges at a Record Pace, CHI. TRIB. (July 20, 2018), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-judges-20180720-story.html#.17, 2017);  
 223.  See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill. 496 U.S. 91 
(1990) (holding unconstitutional a state’s categorical ban on listing board certifications on attorney 
letterhead as potentially “misleading” and in violation of state Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. F.E.C., 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (holding independent 
campaign expenditures by political parties may not be limited under the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971); Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding corporate-funded independ-
ent political advertising may not be restricted without violating the First Amendment); McCutcheon 
v. F.E.C., 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (holding unconstitutional a two-year aggregate campaign contribu-
tion limitation under the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act).  But see Williams-Yulee v. Flor-
ida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (holding a rule which bars judicial candidates from personally 
soliciting contributions did not violate the First Amendment).  
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statutes224 and on credit card companies’ ability to alter account rates in 
response to cardholder defaults without notice.225  Conversely, conservative 
Supreme Court members have joined unanimous opinions affirming an 
insurer’s “reckless disregard” for the Fair Credit Reporting Act constitutes a 
“willful” violation under the statute.226  Altogether, a partisan–ideological 
shift on—much less a single new appointment to—the Supreme Court is not 
definitive evidence of future case dispositions.  No matter the complex 
political and economic trends discussed above, there remains room for policy 
and litigation to confront concerns vis-à-vis the CRAs and the ratings 
industry broadly. 
C.  Policy and Advocacy Options are Constrained – Not Futile 
The possibility of grassroots movements demanding improved CRA 
oversight and accountability—perhaps in the mold of the “consumer 
empowerment programs” exercising public oversight of the U.S. insurance 
sector since the 1980s—offers another suggested avenue for curtailing 
“capture” of regulators and consequently imprudent regulatory decisions.227
But activism and policy advocacy aiming to hold CRAs accountable for their 
failures before and during the crisis also should address decades-old First 
Amendment-based claims of CRAs highlighted in the foregoing.  Without 
anticipating and heading off those constitutional claims, attempts to ensure 
accountability and less-risky financial sector practices face daunting odds. 
By dint of their structural and information-gatekeeping importance in 
the financial system, as well as the compelling framework set forth in 
Omnicare228 and other recent cases, CRAs’ opinions merit comprehensive 
regulatory, policymaking, and judicial reevaluation.  The most-recent cases 
concerning CRAs’ opinions in the context of free speech entitlements, Lowe
and Greenmoss Builders, are nearly four decades old and of dubious utility 
in modern markets; the last two decades of rapid financial innovation and the 
exemption of CRAs from Omnicare’s precise standards strongly favor a 
 224.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Justices Souter and Breyer joining 
the 7–2 majority).  
 225.  Chase Bank U.S.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195 (2011) (Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, So-
tomayor, and Kagan joined the unanimous opinion, though the holding turned upon the timing of 
the change-in-terms transactions in the case preceded passage of regulations compelling such notice 
claimed by the plaintiff.).  
 226.  Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).  
 227.  Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: 
Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 365, 365–396 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss 
eds. 2014).
 228.  See supra note 47. 
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reinvigorated doctrinal approach.  Under present frameworks, ratings are 
granted a patina of intrinsic legitimacy—i.e., in that ratings are statutorily 
required referents for securities regulatory benchmarks—yet the ostensibly 
rigorous development of ratings models and the underlying data which 
support them are claimed as protected “opinions,” pure speech, by the three 
leading CRAs.  When these CRAs’ cases reach the Supreme Court, whether 
in the near-term or several years ahead, Lowe and Greenmoss Builders must 
be abandoned decisively. 
This and all the foregoing is not to suggest CRAs should face 
unbounded liability for less-than-prescient conduct before the crisis and 
Great Recession, nor that CRAs and other financial sector institutions lack 
any First Amendment protections whatsoever.  Rather, the Supreme Court is 
called upon to more clearly and concretely define the bounds of CRAs’ 
opinions–precisely, to classify them properly as forms of commercial 
speech, still protected by intermediate scrutiny upon review in all cases not 
involving overt fraudulence or other forms of illegal misconduct.  Especially 
in future cases, and specifically in the event of another crisis of a magnitude 
seen circa 2007-08, complex and high-stakes dispositions can and should 
disregard decades-old CRA claims and hold CRAs’ ratings opinions to be at
most subject to well-established commercial speech protections, or otherwise 
subject to an Omnicare-like review standard.  These fine-tuned approaches 
would not only align federal regulation of CRAs with traditional 
constitutional understandings, but also would enhance the ratings industry’s 
incentives to and capacities for safeguarding global markets from financial 
crisis.  The stakes could hardly be higher. 
Conclusion
The foregoing discussions highlight myriad unresolved issues–even 
now, nearly a decade since the financial crisis began to unravel–as well as 
the complexity in litigating financial sector liability from the intersections of 
corporate, administrative, and constitutional law.  There are some early, 
coalescing lessons to draw, however, and those lessons should prod CRAs 
and other financial actors toward caution–especially where they rely upon 
tepid constitutional claims from the last century.  For the major investment 
banks after the crisis, a “conflicted” role on both sides of a merger or buyout 
transaction now can trigger aiding and abetting liability in Delaware’s courts, 
a dramatic extension of fiduciary duty doctrines.  Where those same 
institutions knowingly perpetuated financial fraud–packaging and selling 
investment instruments with foreknowledge but nondisclosure of excess 
risks–their litigation prospects are more ambiguous. 
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For U.S.-based CRAs, the outlook remains perplexing and ripe for 
reconsideration by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Ninth and Second Circuits 
have offered at-best unclear guidance for CRA liability generally, while 
Ohio’s Southern District in the Sixth Circuit went further in permitting 
claims against CRAs to enter discovery or trial phases.  At the Sixth Circuit 
level, though, a separate case’s dismissal was affirmed, further muddying 
any inferences drawn therefrom.  Across all cases, however, longstanding 
claims of First Amendment protections for CRA ratings have been kept out 
of issued court opinions or rejected outright, such as where the courts apply 
state law rather than federal securities laws or view commercial speech 
doctrines under Greenmoss Builders exceptionally narrowly.  With 
apparently inconsistent and unsettled views across the Circuit Courts, an 
evident conflict between state fraud laws and federal securities laws, and 
hundreds of millions in settlements since the financial crisis first unfolded, 
the question becomes not if but when definitive guidance will be 
forthcoming. 
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